Restoring Fairness to Campus Sex Tribunals by Ward, Cynthia
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2018
Restoring Fairness to Campus Sex Tribunals
Cynthia Ward
William & Mary Law School, cvward@wm.edu
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
 RESTORING FAIRNESS TO CAMPUS SEX 
TRIBUNALS 
 
CYNTHIA V. WARD* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1074 
II. BASELINE: THE LAW OF CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT ............... 1078 
A. The Law of Campus Sexual Assault .............................. 1081 
 1.  Constitutional Due Process ...................................... 1082 
2.  Statutes Specifically Targeting Campus Sexual 
Misconduct ................................................................ 1084 
3.  Title IX and DOE Regulation ................................... 1085 
B.  Some Troubling Cases .................................................... 1088 
III.  RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM, PARSIMONY, 
PROPORTIONALITY ................................................................... 1097 
A.  Conflicting Intuitions ..................................................... 1098 
B.  Campus Sexual Misconduct Tribunals Inflict Punishment      
 ......................................................................................... 1100 
C.  Centrality of the Harm Principle ................................... 1102 
D. The Principle of Parsimony ............................................ 1109 
E.  Parsimony and Proportionality ...................................... 1110 
F.  Distinguishing Aspiration from Punishment ................ 1111 
G.  Three Common Principles .............................................. 1115 
IV.  THE MODEL APPLIED TO CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT .............. 1116 
A.  The Criminal Law Model in Context ............................. 1116 
1.  Clearly Defined Offenses .......................................... 1118 
2.  Threshold Procedural Protections ............................ 1121 
3.  Victims’ Rights .......................................................... 1124 
4.  Punishment that Fits the Offense ............................ 1125 
B.  Answering the Three Questions ...................................... 1127 
C.  The DOE’s Proposal Would Restore Fundamental Fairness     
 ......................................................................................... 1128 
V.  DOWNSIZING FAIR PROCESS ................................................... 1131 
VI.  CONCLUSION: INSPIRATION FROM CRIMINAL LAW ................. 1137 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 * Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Member, President’s Task 
Force on Prevention of Sexual Assault, College of William & Mary (2014–2015). 
1074 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85.1073 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Pressured by directives from the Obama Department of 
Education (DOE), colleges and universities across the country 
hastily revamped their processes of adjudicating sexual assault, 
making it easier to bring, and prove, charges of sexual misconduct 
on campus.1 These changes have generated substantial concern on 
behalf of accused students. Commentators from both sides of the 
political spectrum have objected, arguing that the new college 
misconduct codes are dismissive of the rights of respondents.2 In the 
past few years, respondents found liable for sexual misconduct under 
the new codes have sued in court, claiming violations of contract or 
due process. In a number of recent cases, the courts have upheld 
those claims.3 
                                                                                                                                
 
 1.  See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Biden and Obama Rewrite the Rulebook on 
College Sexual Assaults, WASH. POST (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-and-obama-rewrite-the-rulebook-on-
college-sexual-assaults/2016/07/03/0773302e-3654-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story. 
html?utm_term=.d8976f8e194c. 
 2.  See, e.g., The Trump Administration’s Approach to Rape on Campus Is 
Welcome, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21728966-barack-obamas-government-put-undue-pressure-colleges-secure-
convictions-return; see also KC JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE 
FRENZY: THE ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 89 (2017); 
LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO CAMPUS 16 
(2017). See generally Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 881 (2016) (discussing the government’s growing interest in the sexual lives 
of college students); Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX 
Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015) (discussing how accused students are 
subject to low standards of proof and possible hearsay); Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization 
and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX. 
L. REV. 15 (2017) (discussing the government’s exertion of pressure on universities to 
enforce sexual misconduct and whether this violates Due Process).  
 3.  See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B271834, 2018 WL 6499696, at *1–2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018) (finding that accused USC student, who had been found 
liable for very serious sexual misconduct and expelled as a result, had been denied a 
fair hearing by the university, where the adjudicator in the case had failed to 
personally assess the credibility of three key witnesses; the respondent had not been 
allowed to submit questions for the adjudicator to ask the complainant; and the 
adjudicator had failed to conduct a fair and thorough investigation as promised in 
the university’s procedures); Doe v. Claremont McKenna Coll., 25 Cal. App. 5th 1055, 
1057–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that accused Claremont McKenna student, 
who had been found liable and suspended for sexual misconduct, had been denied a 
fair hearing by the college where the student faced serious consequences if found 
responsible; the case turned on credibility assessments of the complainant and 
respondent; and the college had failed to require complainant to appear and to 
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Now, the Department of Education (under Secretary Betsy 
DeVos) has responded to those concerns by proposing new Title IX 
regulations that would substantially amend the Obama-era guidance 
in the name of fairness and due process.4 Subject to review and 
approval following the notice and comment process of the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act,5 the proposed reforms address a 
number of issues related to sexual misconduct on campus. Those 
issues include complainants’ and respondents’ constitutional rights 
in this context, definitions of sexual harassment under Title IX, the 
availability of remedies upon a finding of responsibility, and 
institutional obligations as to staffing, notice, and dissemination of 
relevant policies.6 With respect to the investigation and adjudication 
of sexual harassment complaints in particular, the proposed 
regulation would require school-“recipients” (recipients of federal 
aid, the institutions covered under the provisions of Title IX) to:  
 
• Narrow the definition of student-on-student sexual 
harassment under Title IX to include sexual assault or 
“[u]nwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a 
person equal access to the recipient’s [school’s] education 
program or activity.”7 (Previous DOE guidance had defined 
Title IX sex harassment more broadly as “unwelcome conduct 
of a sexual nature.”)8  
                                                                                                                                
 
answer questions from the adjudicator); Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. 
App. 5th 44, 46 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding that accused student, who had been 
suspended for two years after being found liable for sexual misconduct under the 
campus code of the University of California Santa Barbara, had been denied “even a 
semblance of due process” where the respondent “was denied access to critical 
evidence; denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and denied 
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense”). 
 4.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
On November 29, 2018, the Department of Education released its proposed Title IX 
regulations. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or 
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462 (proposed Nov. 
29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter DOE Proposed Rule]. 
 5.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
 6.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 5. 
 7.  Id. at 18.  
 8.  RUSSLYNN ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 4, 
2011) [hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. (a 
significant guidance document regarding Title IX interpretation). 
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• Hold a live hearing to adjudicate formal complaints. At 
this hearing, recipients must allow the parties’ “advisor of 
choice” to cross-examine witnesses—including the 
complainant and respondent.9 (Obama-era DOE guidance did 
not require a live hearing or the opportunity for cross-
examination.)10 
• Structurally separate the investigative, adjudicative, and 
coordinating functions by forbidding schools from allowing 
their Title IX coordinators to act as the claim investigator or 
decision-maker.11 (Prior guidance did not require such 
separation; for example, it allowed a school’s Title IX 
coordinator to also act as investigator and decision-maker.)12   
• Apply the correct standard of proof—either the 
preponderance of the evidence standard or clear and 
convincing evidence standard. The new guidance forbids the 
use of the preponderance standard in sexual harassment 
cases unless the school (1) also uses that standard to 
adjudicate misconduct in areas other than sexual harassment 
but which carry the same maximum penalty, and (2) uses 
that same standard of evidence in cases involving complaints 
against employees of the recipient, including faculty.13 
(Previous guidance required schools to use the preponderance 
standard.)14   
• Treat both complainants and respondents “equitably.” 
Equitable treatment would mean that, in cases involving a 
formal complaint where a respondent is found liable, 
recipients must offer complainants remedies “designed to 
restore or preserve access to the recipient’s educational 
program or activity”; and recipients must offer respondents 
due process protections before imposing any disciplinary 
sanctions.15 
                                                                                                                                
 
 9.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 52. 
 10.  See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8. 
 11.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 63–64. 
 12.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 13.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 62.   
 14.  DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 11. 
 15.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 135. 
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• Evaluate evidence objectively, impartially, and without 
any bias based on a party’s status as complainant or 
respondent.16 
• Ensure that college or university personnel who 
investigate or adjudicate such complaints are properly 
trained using materials which “promote impartial 
investigations and adjudications of sexual harassment.”17 
• Apply a presumption of non-responsibility in favor of 
respondents prior to the conclusion of adjudication.18 
• Bear the burden of proof and of producing sufficient 
evidence, and ensure that those burdens do not fall upon 
either the complainant or the respondent.19 
• Give appropriate notice of the complaint and of relevant 
procedures, and grant the parties equal access to relevant 
evidence uncovered during the recipient’s investigation of the 
complaint.20 
 
The proposed rule strikes a familiar balance, seeking to respect 
allegations of sexual misconduct while also protecting the rights of 
the accused.21 But the conversation about sexual harassment on 
                                                                                                                                
 
 16.  Id. at 135–36. 
 17.  Id. at 136. 
 18.  Id. at 41. 
 19.  Id. at 46. 
 20.  Id. at 48. 
 21.  See, e.g., Betsy DeVos, Betsy DeVos: It’s Time We Balance the Scales of 
Justice In Our Schools, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018),https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/betsy-devos-its-time-we-balance-the-scales-of-justice-in 
-our-schools/2018/11/20/8dc59348-ecd6-11e8-9236-bb94154151d2_story. 
html?utm_term=.21adb8794303 (“Our proposed framework supports survivors while 
safeguarding due process, helping make Title IX protections against sex 
discrimination a reality for all students. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how 
people can object to procedures premised on the foundational concept of due process, 
or how anybody could have confidence in a system that lacks such protections.”); 
Susan Kruth, New Proposed Title IX Regulations Feature Essential Safeguards for 
Free Speech and Due Process On Campus, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. 
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/new-proposed-title-ix-regulations-feature-
essential-safeguards-for-free-speech-and-due-process-on-campus/ (DOE’s new rules, 
“if finalized, would help ensure [that schools] afford fair hearings to students accused 
of sexual misconduct while taking seriously all accusations of such misconduct.”); 
Daily News Editorial Board, Lesson Learned: Betsy DeVos (Mostly) Gets Title IX 
Rules Right, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-edit-lesson-learned-on-title-ix-20181116-
story.html (“mostly, DeVos has rebalanced scales that had tipped out of whack.”).   
1078 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85.1073 
 
campus takes place against a backdrop in which ideological fervor 
has precipitated a head-on conflict between victims’ rights and 
procedural fairness. Amid impassioned cries to “Believe Survivors”—
a standard which suggests that protecting the rights of the accused 
is secondary, or even harmful, to achieving just results—it can be 
difficult to see the very important difference between a political 
slogan and a fair standard of punishment.22 As a means of calling 
attention to the social reality of sexual abuse, the call to “Believe 
Survivors” has been powerful and effective. But as a method of 
adjudicating individual charges of sexual misconduct, it would be a 
disaster. Colleges and universities must now recognize this and 
amend their codes of conduct accordingly.   
But how? What constitutes fair process in this context, and do 
the new DOE rules meet that standard? It can be difficult to see 
through the fog of political ideology on this topic. But the central 
issues are actually quite clear. This Article explains why. It also 
develops a model for fairness-based procedure in the context of 
college- and university-based sexual misconduct cases, and assesses 
DOE’s proposed reforms under that model. I conclude that the 
reforms, though not perfect, would go a long way toward restoring 
fairness to the process of adjudicating sexual assault on campus.  
 
II. BASELINE: THE LAW OF CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
 
Any legitimate process for adjudicating campus-based claims of 
sexual misconduct must persuasively answer three questions: 
 
1. Defining Misconduct: With respect to sexual relationships 
at colleges and universities, which harms are punishable 
“misconduct”? Perhaps the easiest response is “All.” But the 
easy answer turns out to be wrong. A fair standard must 
clearly define “sexual misconduct,” and must also clearly 
delineate related terms (such as “affirmative consent” and 
“incapacitation”) that are central to understanding it. 
                                                                                                                                
 
 22.  For examples of negative reaction to DOE’s proposed rule, see Helen 
Rosenthal & Mary Haviland, Campus Sex-Assault Victims, Betrayed: Reject Betsy 
DeVos’ Overhaul of Title IX, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-a-huge-step-back-for-campus-sex-
assault-victims-20181116-story.html; Amanda Marcotte, Betsy DeVos Moves to 
Demolish Title IX, Silence Sexual Abuse Victims, SALON (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.salon.com/2018/11/16/betsy-devos-moves-to-demolish-title-ix-silence-
sexual-abuse-victims/.  
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2. Adjudication Process: When a student has been accused 
of sexual misconduct by another student, what procedural 
protections and adjudicatory methods are necessary in order 
to (1) respect the victim’s claim; (2) protect the rights of the 
accused person; and (3) guarantee the integrity of the 
university process, thus maximizing the chance that it will 
produce accurate answers on the core question of 
responsibility? Many of the concerns expressed about recent 
case outcomes proceed from perceived defects in this area.23 
3. Sanctions: Among the sanctions that are possible in the 
collegiate setting, what punishments are appropriate for acts 
of sexual misconduct? Again, responding to a number of well-
known cases in which colleges have let offenders off with a 
slap on the wrist, it is perhaps tempting, now, to embrace the 
other extreme and make expulsion the default sanction for 
all cases of sexual misconduct. Some schools have moved that 
way.24 Most schools, however, still decide sanctions on a case-
by-case basis.25 Which is the better model? 
For institutions of higher education, the task of creating and 
enforcing fairness in this area is freighted with historical baggage.  
Sexual assault is a serious wrong. Colleges and universities have not 
always treated it that way, sometimes opting to protect unrelated 
institutional interests at the expense of victims’ right to redress.26 
                                                                                                                                
 
 23.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63, 76, 101 (discussing recent Title 
IX cases at Northwestern University, Occidental University, and Brandeis 
University, respectively). 
 24.  See, e.g., Beth Howard, How Colleges Are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 28, 2015, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-battling-sexual-
violence (“A growing number of schools are also stiffening penalties for offenders. At 
Duke, for example, expulsion is now the favored sanction.”); Jake New, Expulsion 
Presumed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 27, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/06/27/should-expulsion-be-default-
discipline-policy-students-accused-sexual-assault (“Colleges facing criticism over 
their handling of sexual assault allegations debate whether the best policy is to 
automatically kick out those found guilty.”); see also Howard, supra note 24. 
(discussing the policy at Duke University, which makes expulsion the “preferred” 
sanction in cases where an accused student has been found responsible for sexual 
misconduct). 
 25.  New, supra note 24.  
 26.  See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, JMU Sued for Punishing Sexual Assault with 
‘Expulsion After Graduation,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015, 2:26 PM), 
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That is a problem and must be fixed.  But simply reversing 
direction—forcing respondents, rather than complainants, to suffer 
the costs of hasty, reactive, overly politicized adjudications—is 
hardly an adequate solution. Higher education must craft a standard 
that treats both parties fairly and produces accurate and just 
results.  Further, the process of investigating and adjudicating 
claims of sexual misconduct must not only be fair; it must also be 
perceived as fair—in other words, the process should be transparent, 
accessible, and explainable to all members of the community. 
Of course colleges and universities lack the power to answer 
these questions in a vacuum. Although college disciplinary process is 
not technically “law” (that is, the rules under which campus 
tribunals operate are not created or enforced by legislatures and 
courts), formal law has decidedly influenced, and sometimes 
dictated, those rules. To understand the reality in which campus 
sexual misconduct cases now operate, we first review some basics 
about the legal framework that shapes and constrains it.  
  
                                                                                                                                
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/09/jmu-sued-sexual-assault_n_6820026.html 
(discussing a case where a student-plaintiff filed a Title IX action after James 
Madison University found three male students responsible for sexually assaulting 
and sexually harassing her, and the school punished them with expulsion after 
graduation); see also Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-
allegations-against-fsu-jameis-winston.html. Bogdanich’s article raised questions 
about Florida State University’s failure to investigate sexual assault allegations 
against its star football player Jameis Winston until after football season ended: 
“The athletic department had known early on that Mr. Winston had been accused of 
a serious crime. . . . This knowledge should have set off an inquiry by the university.” 
Id. “According to federal rules, any athletic department official who learns of possible 
sexual misconduct is required to pass it on to school administrators.” Id. “‘Why did 
the school not even attempt to investigate the matter until after the football season?’ 
said John Clune, another lawyer for the accuser.” Id. Bogdanich’s article also quoted 
from an interview with former Florida prosecutor Adam Ruiz. Id. Discussing a 
sexual assault allegation at F.S.U. that he had prosecuted a decade before the 
Jameis Winston case, Mr. Ruiz told The New York Times: “I learned quickly what 
football meant in the South . . . . Clearly, it meant a lot. And with respect to this case 
I learned that keeping players on the field was a priority.” Id.  
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A. The Law of Campus Sexual Assault 
 
The law exerts a significant, but complex, influence on the 
creation and implementation of campus sexual misconduct codes. 
First, as numerous lawsuits now demonstrate,27 the courts often 
serve as the ultimate venue of appeal in cases where either party to 
a sexual misconduct allegation feels wronged by the on-campus 
process. Second, the courts, the police, and campus personnel must 
often follow legal rules that regulate their interaction with each 
other in these cases.28 Third, formal law increasingly mandates 
particular answers to such core questions as what constitutes sexual 
misconduct on college campuses, how such misconduct should be 
investigated and adjudicated, and what sanctions should be imposed 
when an accused student is found responsible.29 Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Amendment Act of 1972 is, obviously, a major source of 
positive law in this area, and I discuss that further below.30 First, 
however, several other relevant legal sources should be named.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 27.  See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing lawsuits filed by 
students protesting sanctions imposed on them by college hearing panels in sexual 
misconduct cases). Of course, complainants are also filing suits against universities, 
often on the ground that the university mishandled their allegation of sexual 
misconduct against another student. See, e.g., Edwin Rios & Madison Pauly, This 
Explosive Lawsuit Could Change How Colleges Deal With Athletes Accused of Sexual 
Assault, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/sexual-assault-case-against-university-
tennessee-explained (discussing a lawsuit by eight college women who claim that the 
University of Tennessee mishandled their sexual assault allegations against football 
and basketball players at the school). 
 28.  See, e.g., Ashe Schow, New Campus Sexual Assault Laws Go into Effect in 
Virginia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 2, 2015, 1:08 PM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/new-campus-sexual-assault-laws-go-into-effect-
in-virginia/article/2567530 (discussing new state statutes in Virginia that compel 
reporting of sexual misconduct by university employees and regulate interaction 
between campus police and local law enforcement). 
 29.  Perhaps responding to this proliferation of law, the American Law 
Institute has recently entered the fray. The A.L.I.’s campus-rape project will produce 
suggested guidelines for universities, legislatures, and courts charged with creating 
and enforcing campus sexual misconduct codes. See Sarah Brown, How a Prominent 
Legal Group Could Change the Way Colleges Handle Rape, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/How-a-Prominent-Legal-Group/234467.  
 30.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 
(2018); see also infra Part II.A.3.   
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1. Constitutional Due Process 
 
Due process, in the formal constitutional sense, is of clear but 
limited use in designing college sexual misconduct codes. Although 
public colleges and universities are considered government actors 
and must therefore comply with the commands of due process,31 the 
concept itself (as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower 
courts) is famously flexible and context-dependent. Under the test 
outlined in the Supreme Court’s go-to case Mathews v. Eldridge,32 
the amount of process that is “due” in any particular setting 
“requires consideration [by courts] of three factors: (1) the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures 
would entail.”33 The test captures the bedrock intuition that where a 
defendant’s private interest is large and the risk of wrongful results 
is great, protective procedures are warranted unless the government 
can articulate an interest of overriding importance.  
In the educational setting, courts have made clear that due 
process is relevant but does not necessarily mandate the full panoply 
of procedural rights accorded to criminal defendants. For example, 
courts have ruled that some process is “due” to students charged 
with disciplinary violations of their public school’s code of conduct. 
In the 1975 case of Goss v. Lopez,34 a group of high school students 
sued their school claiming that their suspensions violated due 
process. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the case set a due 
process “floor” consisting of three fundamental requirements. At 
                                                                                                                                
 
 31.  Private universities are not government actors and are therefore not bound 
by the constitutional commands of due process; but, they are constrained by the law 
of contract to keep promises they have made to students (for example, promises to 
investigate or adjudicate disciplinary cases in a certain way) and to follow their own 
rules in good faith. See, e.g., HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE & JOSH GEWOLB, FIRE’S 
GUIDE TO DUE PROCESS AND CAMPUS JUSTICE 41–56 (William Creeley ed., 2014), 
https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/special-collections/fire-guides/fires-
guide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-fair-
procedure-on-campus-full-text/; see also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8 
(acknowledging the constitutionally based due process obligation of public colleges 
and universities). 
 32.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 33.  Id. at 321. 
 34.  419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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minimum, the Court held, a public school student facing disciplinary 
action of this kind must “be given oral or written notice of the 
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side 
of the story.”35 Although Goss itself involved high school students,36 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in the case took favorable notice of an 
earlier Fifth Circuit case, Dixon v. Alabama State Board of 
Education, involving a due process appeal by college students who 
had been expelled from Alabama State College without a hearing.37 
In Dixon, the Fifth Circuit held that “the State cannot condition the 
granting of even a privilege [such as a college education] upon the 
renunciation of a constitutional right to due process.”38  
In Goss v. Lopez, the longest student suspension was ten days.39 
Notably, the Court opined that in cases threatening more serious 
sanctions, due process “may require more formal procedures.”40 
Thus, the “floor” is not also a ceiling—a fact that is relevant in the 
context of campus sexual assault cases where the punishment for a 
finding of liability can include sanctions (such as expulsion and 
notations on transcripts and registrar’s records) that not only end a 
student’s education at the adjudicating college but as a practical 
matter, may end the student’s opportunity to get a college education 
at all.41 
A number of recent lower-court cases have specifically addressed 
the due-process rights of respondents in cases of sexual misconduct 
under Title IX. For example, in two Sixth Circuit cases, Doe v. 
University of Cincinnati42 and Doe v. Baum,43 the court ruled that in 
cases that centrally involve credibility judgments about the 
testimony of witnesses, due process requires public universities to 
permit the accused to cross-examine the accuser and other adverse 
witnesses.44 
                                                                                                                                
 
 35.  Id. at 581. 
 36.  Id. at 567. 
 37.  294 F.2d 150, 151–52 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 38.  Id. at 156. 
 39.  Goss, 419 U.S. at 584–85 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 40.  Id. at 584. 
 41.  See, e.g., SILVERGLATE & GEWOLB, supra note 31, at 41–56 
 42.  Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 43.  Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 44.  Id. at 578 (“[I]f a public university has to choose between competing 
narratives to resolve a case, the university must give the accused student or his 
agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the 
presence of a neutral fact-finder.”).  
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In the spirited national conversation about this subject, the 
concept of “due process” has perhaps created more confusion than 
clarity. Attorneys and legal scholars tend to employ the term in a 
technical sense, referring to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and to the body of 
Supreme Court precedent which has grown up around them.45 But in 
a broader sense, the calls for due process invoke a normative 
standard to which (for example) the constitutional distinctions 
between public and private colleges and universities is irrelevant. 
That standard concerns the relationship between process and 
punishment. It’s a relationship whose fullest expression appears in 
the criminal law, but which is ultimately grounded in the more 
general concept of fairness. The core idea is simple: When 
institutions set out to punish individuals for an offense, they have a 
moral obligation (rooted in fairness) to accord the accused person the 
fullest possible rights and protections against the possibility of 
wrongful conviction. 
 
2. Statutes Specifically Targeting Campus Sexual Misconduct 
 
The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and 
Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act), passed in 1990, required 
colleges and universities receiving federal aid to collect and publish 
information about crimes, including sex crimes, that occur on 
campus.46 The Act has since been amended for the purpose of 
prompting aid-receiving higher education institutions to develop 
policies specifically targeting sexual assault, and to include 
requirements that said institutions report the incidence of stalking, 
domestic violence, and dating violence.47 
                                                                                                                                
 
 45.  U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV; see, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and 
State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 15 (2017) (arguing that constitutional rules surrounding “state action” doctrine 
should apply to private as well as public colleges and universities); Jim Newberry, 
After the Dear Colleague Letter: Developing Enhanced Due Process Protections for 
Title IX Sexual Assault Cases at Public Institutions (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3166561) 
(outlining a “vision for due process” which “generally focus[es] on the due process 
obligations of public institutions” under the state action doctrine, but urging private 
institutions to adopt the same framework).   
 46.  20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2018).  
 47.  Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 
1581 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2018)); Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2018)). 
2018]     RESTORING FAIRNESS 1085 
 
More recent federal and state statutes have specifically 
responded to the national debate about sexual assault on campus 
and the Obama Administration’s approach to it. State legislatures 
and the U.S. Congress have considered or passed statutes 
addressing the problem.48  
 
3. Title IX and DOE Regulation 
 
Most of the pressure to amend college and university sexual 
misconduct codes came from a third source of law: federal 
regulations, specifically those enforced by the DOE as part of Title 
IX.49 Title IX itself simply states: “No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”50 Over the years since the statute was enacted, a series 
of interpretations by the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
specified that sexual harassment, including harassment which 
creates a “hostile environment,” counts as sex discrimination under 
Title IX; that student-upon-student harassment is covered; and that 
covered institutions of higher education must create procedures for 
ending such harassment.51 During the Obama Administrations, OCR 
kicked it up a notch, pressuring colleges and universities to make 
their processes more complainant-friendly by launching probes into 
non-compliant institutions and threatening to withdraw their 
federal funding if they refused.52 By early 2017, more than 200 
                                                                                                                                
 
 48.  See, e.g., Heather Mongilio, Va. Campus Sexual Assault Bills Signed Into 
Law, ARL NOW (May 29, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/05/29/va-
campus-sexual-assault-bills-signed-into-law/. California and New York have enacted 
“affirmative consent” statutes mandating that all institutions receiving certain state 
financial support enact policies which that conform. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 
(West 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2018); see also Campus 
Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/590/text; Safe Campus Act 
of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/3403/text. 
 49.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Title IX regulation, see Gersen 
& Suk, supra note 2, at 897–905. 
 52.  See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized 
Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1062–67 (2015) 
(describing DOE’s efforts to light a fire under colleges and universities on this issue). 
In 2011, the DOE penned its famous Dear Colleague letter, which launched the 
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institutions of higher education were under investigation by OCR for 
alleged violations of the civil rights of students in sexual assault 
cases.53 The Obama OCR made clear that (1) it considered sexual 
violence to be actionable under the Department’s Title IX mandate 
to fight education-based gender discrimination;54 and (2) it had a 
detailed and continuing interest in overseeing university processes 
for investigating and punishing sexual misconduct on campus.55 
During the Obama years, OCR took the view that, as the subject of 
civil litigation under the sexual harassment provisions of Title IX, 
allegations of sexual assault on campus should be adjudicated 
independently of the criminal process and may feature fewer 
procedural protections for accused persons than would be required 
for criminal charges.56 In its now-famous Dear Colleague letter of 
                                                                                                                                
 
modern era of sexual misconduct regulation by laying down specific rules and 
guidance to colleges and universities as to its policies and procedures in this area. 
See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8.   
 53.  See, e.g., Nick Anderson, At First, 55 Schools Faced Sexual Violence 
Investigations. Now the List Has Quadrupled, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/01/18/at-first-55-schools-
faced-sexual-violence-investigations-now-the-list-has-quadrupled/?utm_term=.0ecb3 
b 2cc79c. 
 54.  “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972[, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 
(2018)], and its implementing regulations, [34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018)], prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by 
recipients of Federal financial assistance. Sexual harassment of students, which 
includes acts of sexual violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. 
In order to assist recipients, which include school districts, colleges, and 
universities . . . in meeting these obligations, [the Dear Colleague letter] explains 
that the requirements of Title IX pertaining to sexual harassment also cover sexual 
violence, and lays out the specific Title IX requirements applicable to sexual 
violence.” DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 1. 
 55.  See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8 (requiring that 
beneficiaries of federal financial assistance conform to Title IX). 
 56.  Id. at 10 (“Police investigations may be useful for fact-gathering; but 
because the standards for criminal investigations are different, police investigations 
or reports are not determinative of whether sexual harassment or violence violates 
Title IX. Conduct may constitute unlawful sexual harassment under Title IX even if 
the police do not have sufficient evidence of a criminal violation. In addition, a 
criminal investigation into allegations of sexual violence does not relieve the school 
of its duty under Title IX to resolve complaints promptly and equitably.”); see also 
Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, No, We Can’t Just Leave College Sexual 
Assault to the Police, POLITICO (Dec. 3, 2014), 
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/uva-sexual-assault-campus-113294 (“The 
history of Title IX illuminates a fact that is too often overlooked in conversations 
about campus rape today: University adjudication is neither a substitute for nor a 
direct parallel to the criminal justice system. After all, student-victims can report to 
both their universities and the police; the two systems are not mutually exclusive. 
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April 2011, OCR instructed the approximately 7,000 colleges and 
universities that accept federal aid to use the lowest possible 
standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) in adjudicating 
complaints of sexual assault; discouraged institutions from allowing 
respondents or their advocates to cross-examine witnesses; allowed 
complainants as well as respondents to appeal not-responsible 
verdicts (thereby potentially subjecting respondents to the 
institutional equivalent of double jeopardy); and set down a time 
table of sixty days during which schools should, in general, 
adjudicate and dispose of each case.57 In subsequent guidance, OCR 
made clear that schools could authorize their Title IX coordinators to 
investigate complaints and to determine sanctions and supportive 
measures upon findings of responsibility.58 
The Obama OCR also made clear that colleges and universities 
must have an independent process for adjudicating these cases—
that it would not be acceptable, for example, for a college to simply 
defer all complaints of sexual assault on campus to the police and 
the criminal system. This federal mandate—that colleges must 
investigate and decide these cases themselves—essentially forced 
institutions of higher education to independently adjudicate sexual 
misconduct complaints or face the possibilities of federal 
investigation and loss of federal funding.59 
In response, colleges and universities overhauled their sexual 
misconduct codes in accordance with the 2011 letter and other OCR 
guidance documents that followed.60 By 2015, many had begun to 
implement the new codes. The results thus far have been decidedly 
mixed. While some empirical evidence suggests that the number of 
sexual assault claims has risen on campuses nationwide61—a 
                                                                                                                                
 
Campus adjudication is a separate antidiscrimination right protecting students’ 
access to educational opportunities at their schools, unburdened by historical and 
persistent gender-based disparities. (In this way, Title IX mirrors not the criminal 
justice system but Title VII, the federal workplace antidiscrimination law that 
recognizes the particular impediments to equality that may arise in an employment 
context and which requires employers to respond to violence reports.)”). 
 57.  See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8. 
 58.  QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 12, at 11.   
 59.  See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]he school’s Title IX 
investigation is different from any law enforcement investigation, and a law 
enforcement investigation does not relieve the school of its independent Title IX 
obligation to investigate the conduct.”). 
 60.  See, e.g., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 12. 
 61.  See, e.g., Max Kutner, U.S. Students Filed Record 10,000 Civil Rights 
Complaints Last Year, NEWSWEEK (May 4, 2016, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/department-education-office-civil-rights-report-455752. 
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possible indication that victims now feel more comfortable bringing 
such claims forward—serious concerns about the accuracy, 
transparency, impartiality, and overall fairness of campus-based 
adjudications have also been expressed.62   
 
B. Some Troubling Cases 
 
A few recent Title IX cases (a hostile environment case that did 
not involve a charge of sexual assault and three other cases that did 
charge sexual assault) offer a better sense of where things stand 
today. 
Case 1. A feminist professor at a top university, published an 
article about “sexual paranoia” on campus, arguing that a recently 
enacted sexual misconduct code at the university had “infantilized” 
students and could reinforce invidious stereotypes of women.63 In 
response to the piece, two graduate students at the university filed a 
Title IX claim against the professor on the ground that her article 
violated the university’s sex harassment policy.64 The university’s 
president announced that he would consider the petition.65 Some two 
weeks later, the campus Title IX administrator informed the accused 
professor of the action against her, adding that (1) the university 
had retained outside counsel who would question her about her 
article; (2) she (the professor-respondent) had no right to an attorney 
and would be limited to assistance from a university “support 
person” who would not be allowed to speak during the proceedings; 
and (3) she would not be informed of the charges against her before 
                                                                                                                                
 
 62.  Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 884; see also Jeannie Suk Gersen, Laura 
Kipnis’s Endless Trial by Title IX, NEW YORKER (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/laura-kipniss-endless-trial-by-title-ix. 
Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk’s more general critique of “bureaucratic sex creep”—
of which the increasing regulation of sex on campus is a prime example—is also well 
worth reading in this context. See generally Gersen & Suk, supra note 2 (providing 
examples of demographics such as ethnicity being excluded from reports, which 
prevent the public from recognizing patterns of injustice). 
 63.  Laura Kipnis, Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351/. The 
Kipnis case is a case of campus-based sexual harassment, but not sexual assault, 
under Title IX. Id. The procedural defaults which characterized the handling of her 
case by Northwestern, however, have become common to both types of cases. See 
generally LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO 
CAMPUS (2017) (offering a broad discussion of the Kipnis case). 
 64.  Laura Kipnis, My Title IX Inquisition, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 
2015), http://chronicle.com/article/My-Title-IX-Inquisition/230489/. 
 65.  Id. 
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she was questioned about them.66 The professor later recalled: 
“Apparently the idea was that they’d tell me the charges, and then, 
while I was collecting my wits, interrogate me about them. The term 
‘kangaroo court’ came to mind.”67 The professor received the same 
refusal when she asked the university’s investigators themselves for 
advance notice of the charges against her.68 The investigators 
eventually agreed to inform the professor-respondent of the charges 
in advance of the interrogation but denied her request to record the 
session, refused to give her a written copy of the charges against her, 
and asked her not to speak publicly about the matter.69 By contrast, 
a graduate student at the university published an attack on the 
professor’s article that revealed the existence of the Title IX 
complaints and demonstrated more knowledge about the university’s 
process for resolving such complaints than the university had seen 
fit to share with the accused professor.70 Meanwhile, the designated 
university “support person,” a member of the Faculty Senate who 
had accompanied the accused professor to a meeting with the 
investigators, himself became the target of a Title IX investigation 
for speaking in the Senate about his concern that the university 
process he had witnessed violated academic freedom.71 
The university’s Title IX investigators informed the respondent 
that the case would be decided under a “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard of proof but refused her access to the evidence 
                                                                                                                                
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. The same thing happened when Professor Kipnis asked the university-
hired investigators to see the charges against her before meeting with them: “They 
told me, cordially, that they wanted to set up a meeting during which they would 
inform me of the charges and pose questions.” Id.; see also TheFIREorg, In Her Own 
Words: Laura Kipnis’ ‘Title IX Inquisition’ at Northwestern (VIDEO), YouTube (Apr. 
6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVGOp0IffOQ (Professor Kipnis: “You 
never get the charges in writing, and I’ve heard that from other people since.”). 
 69.  Kipnis, supra note 64 (“We finally agreed to schedule a Skype session in 
which they would inform me of the charges and I would not answer questions. . . . I 
said I wanted to record the session; they refused but said I could take notes. The 
reasons for these various interdictions were never explained. I’d plummeted into an 
underground world of secret tribunals and capricious, medieval rules, and I wasn’t 
supposed to tell anyone about it.”). 
 70.  Id.; see also Lauren Leydon-Hardy, What’s a President to Do?: Trampling 
Title IX and Other Scary Ideas, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2015, 3:50 PM),http: 
//www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-leydonhardy/whats-a-president-to-do-trampling-
title-ix-and-other-scary-ideas_b_7001932.html (discussing the Title IX action against 
Professor Kipnis and defending the complainants in that action). 
 71.  Kipnis, supra note 63. 
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that would form the basis of their findings.72 Under the university’s 
procedures for handling this type of Title IX complaint, investigators 
make affirmative findings as to the facts and the misconduct 
charge—in short, they simultaneously act as investigators and 
adjudicators in the case.73 The professor was informed that she must 
wait sixty days for their report in order to know what those findings 
were.74 The professor was given no opportunity to present her case 
at a hearing where she might learn the evidentiary basis for either 
of the two complaints against her.75 
Case 2. On a weekend evening early in their first semester, two 
college freshmen (whom I will call Jack and Jill) got drunk at 
separate events, then spent the night together having sex.76 Before 
going to Jack’s room to have sex with him, Jill texted Jack to confirm 
that he had a condom.77 She then texted a friend and informed her 
that she, Jill, intended to have sex. 78 Upon arriving in Jack’s room, 
Jill again asked for a condom.79 During the night a friend stopped by 
Jack’s room to see if Jill was alright; she said that she was.80 The 
next morning both Jill and Jack had very partial memories about 
what had happened.81 Nonetheless, Jill filed a Title IX action against 
Jack for sexual assault.82  
College policy at the time provided that contested complaints of 
this kind would normally be adjudicated by a hearing panel 
consisting of faculty and administrators.83 Instead the college hired a 
local employment law attorney to adjudicate the case—a decision the 
                                                                                                                                
 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  See id.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Professor Kipnis’s “trial by Title IX” did not end there. See Suk Gersen, 
supra note 61 (detailing the subsequent Title IX-based targeting of Professor Kipnis). 
 76.  Richard Dorment, Occidental Justice: The Disastrous Fallout When Drunk 
Sex Meets Academic Bureaucracy, ESQUIRE (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/ 
news-politics/a33751/ occidental-justice-case/. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. (citing the relevant texts from the college’s official report on the 
incident). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. (“According to college policy, ‘Formal resolution of a complaint . . . will 
occur through the use of a Conduct Conference’—which is recommended for 
uncontested accusations—‘or a Hearing Panel . . . which typically consist of three 
members drawn from a pool of trained faculty and campus administrators.’”). 
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college refused to explain.84 By a chain of reasoning that apparently 
complied with the college misconduct code, the college-hired 
adjudicator found that (1) Jack and Jill had sex; (2) Jack could have 
reasonably believed that Jill had in fact consented to sex; (3) 
although Jill was moving under her own power and was aware of 
where she was at the time, she was so drunk that she was 
incapacitated under the college’s definition of that state; (4) Jack 
was intoxicated too, but his intoxication would not affect the 
outcome; (5) had Jack not been intoxicated, he would have perceived 
that Jill was too drunk to validly consent to sex; and therefore, (6) 
Jack had sexually assaulted Jill.85 Jack was expelled from the 
college.86  
Because the outcome of the action would appear on his transcript 
and in the records of the college registrar, Jack had scant chance of 
being admitted to any other college.87 After his expulsion, Jack 
attempted to counterclaim. He argued that Jill had initiated the 
sexual encounter and since he, Jack, was also drunk at the time, Jill 
had sexually assaulted him.88 Jack’s attorney advised him that 
anything Jack said in the college proceeding could be used against 
him in a subsequent legal proceeding, but the college refused Jack’s 
request to bring his attorney to meet with college officials.89 When 
Jack declined to meet without his attorney, the college rejected his 
counterclaim.90 Under the circumstances, it appeared that Jill had 
gained an unrebuttable advantage simply by filing first, suggesting 
that under college policy, vindication belonged to the speedy rather 
than to the just. The next case may support that suspicion.91 
                                                                                                                                
 
 84.  Id. (“Occidental’s policy permits it to appoint an external adjudicator at its 
sole discretion. It declined to explain its decision, either to [Jack]’s attorney or to 
Esquire.”). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. In fact, his admission to one other college was rescinded when that 
college discovered that he had been expelled for sexual assault. Id. Jack’s admission 
to yet another college was not immediately rescinded only because he successfully 
petitioned a court to stay the college’s order and sanctions pending the outcome of his 
lawsuit against the college. Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See, e.g., Caitlin Flanagan, Mutually Nonconsensual Sex, ATLANTIC (June 
1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/title-ix-is-too-easy-to-
abuse/561650/ (“[T]he functionaries of the college sex panic have an obdurate habit of 
determining that the victim of a blearily remembered amorous encounter is the 
person who decides to report it, with all ties broken by the one who reports it first.”). 
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Case 3. “Jack’s” attempted countersuit, above, suggests that 
some college misconduct policies contain such vague definitions of 
key terms like “consent” and “incapacitation” that either party, or 
both parties, might be guilty of sexual assault. A more recent case 
makes this even more clear. Plaintiff “Jane Roe” was suspended 
from a state university for engaging in sexual contact with another 
student who was intoxicated (and therefore incapacitated and 
unable to consent).92 Plaintiff Roe filed suit in protest, averring the 
following facts: Jane Roe and “John Doe,” both students at the 
university, attended a party on September 30, 2017.93 Both were 
drinking. After John Doe said he wanted to go home because he was 
drunk, the two left the party together and went to John Doe’s house, 
where Jane Roe fell asleep on John Doe’s bed.94 At some point that 
night, John Doe climbed into bed with Jane Roe and the two had 
sexual contact which involved John Doe touching Jane Roe’s vagina, 
after which Jane Roe inquired, “Is there anything else you want to 
do?”95 John Doe answered in the negative, and both went back to 
sleep.96 Two days later John Doe filed a Title IX complaint alleging 
that Jane Roe had engaged in sexual conduct with John Doe while 
the latter was incapacitated and therefore unable to consent.97 The 
university agreed and Jane Roe was suspended indefinitely.98 In her 
lawsuit Jane Roe claimed that the school violated her constitutional 
rights, not only because it disciplined her in the case, but also 
because it failed to discipline John Doe—suggesting that, under the 
facts of the case, John Doe was actually the perpetrator.99 The case 
demonstrates the bizarre reality that, under the terms of many 
schools’ sexual misconduct codes, both parties to a particular sexual 
encounter may be guilty of assaulting each other.100 
                                                                                                                                
 
 92.  See id. 
 93.  Robby Soave, Male Student Accuses Female Student of Sexual Assault. She 
Says He Wanted Revenge, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (May 11, 2018, 4:15 PM), 
https://reason.com/blog/2018/05/11/cincinnati-rape-title-ix-doe-roe-sex. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See, e.g., Complaint at 29, Roe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1-18-cv-00312-
TSB (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018); Flanagan, supra note 91 (“Is it possible for two people 
to simultaneously sexually assault each other? This is the question . . . [that] the 
University of Cincinnati now addresses . . . .”); Soave, supra note 93 (discussing the 
same case and opining that “Title IX creates a prisoner’s dilemma: students have to 
file sexual misconduct complaint to avoid becoming the accused”). 
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Case 4. Finally, another perplexing issue arising from the 
vagueness of college codes: Is there such a thing as normal sex? In 
their comprehensive critique of the “sex bureaucracy” created under 
Title IX, Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk discuss the case of Doe v. 
Brandeis University,101 in which the plaintiff challenged the 
university’s determination that he had committed “serious sexual 
transgressions” and the university’s placement of a permanent 
notation in to that effect in his educational record.102 The student’s 
alleged offenses included:  
 
[T]ouching the clothed groin of the complainant (who would 
soon be his boyfriend) while the two watched a movie; 
occasionally waking his boyfriend with a kiss; looking at his 
boyfriend’s groin while showering together; and, while at his 
boyfriend’s father’s house, attempting to perform oral sex 
when his boyfriend did not want it.103   
 
To state the facts of these cases is to name the arguments 
against them. Particularly troubling are:  
 
• The secrecy of campus sexual misconduct proceedings, 
which has the foreseeable effects of making such proceedings 
impervious to public critique or accountability, and of 
allowing inaccurate rumors (e.g., that an expelled student is 
a “rapist” when no allegation of rape has been made or 
charged) to spread unchecked.104 
• The lack of a process for filtering out false or flimsy 
allegations before subjecting a respondent to a full-scale 
investigation.105 
• Inadequate notice to accused persons of potentially 
career-ending sexual misconduct charges against them.106  
• The refusal to set down allegations in writing.107 
                                                                                                                                
 
 101.  177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 102.  Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 938 (citing Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 
at 571). 
 103.  Id.    
 104.  See Kipnis, supra note 64. 
 105.  See, e.g., id. (“As I understand it, any Title IX charge that’s filed has to be 
investigated, which effectively empowers anyone on campus to individually decide, 
and expand, what Title IX covers. Anyone with a grudge, a political agenda, or a 
desire for attention can quite easily leverage the system.”). 
 106.  See, e.g., id. (claiming that she would not receive information on the 
substance of the complaint until she met with investigators). 
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• The refusal to allow the accused person to see the evidence 
against him or her before the case is adjudicated.108 
• The refusal to offer a full and fair hearing staffed by 
impartial, well-trained personnel.109  
• The refusal to permit well-trained advocates for the 
parties and allow them, by questioning of witnesses, to reveal 
the strengths and weaknesses of the case before such a 
panel.110 
• The vagueness of key terms in college conduct codes—
“coercion,” “consent,” and “incapacitation”—which are often 
defined in language so broad that it fails to inform students 
and college adjudicators about the nature of sexual 
misconduct.111 
• The fact that some colleges and universities have done 
away with the requirement of a live hearing in sexual 
misconduct cases. Instead, these institutions have put their 
Title IX administrator in charge of the entire adjudicatory 
process (excluding appeals), presenting an obvious threat of 
bias resulting from an equally obvious conflict of interest 
                                                                                                                                
 
 107.  See id. 
 108.  See, e.g., id. (claiming that she was not presented with any evidence 
against her). 
 109.  Many of the new campus codes provide that investigators and adjudicators 
in these cases must be “trained.” But since most do not require that such personnel 
have actual law-enforcement or criminal adjudication experience, it is unclear what 
such training consists of or how rigorous it might or might not be. The outside 
adjudicator in the Occidental case, for example, was a local attorney who specialized 
in employment law. Dorment, supra note 76. The university refused to explain why it 
had chosen her to adjudicate the matter or disclose any prior relevant experience or 
training she may have had in adjudicating cases of sexual misconduct either in the 
civil or the criminal sphere. See id. This is not to say that she, or other adjudicators, 
never do have such experience. Some do. The concern is that broad university 
discretion on the issue keeps the public, including those accused of sexual 
misconduct, in the dark about who will decide the case and what their qualifications 
may be. 
 110.  See Kipnis, supra note 64 (claiming that the school would not allow the 
accused to have a lawyer present, but would allow a “support person” from the 
university community, even though that person would not be allowed to speak). 
 111.  See, e.g., Dorment, supra note 76. “[I]n an apparent effort to show 
Occidental’s inconsistent application of its own sexual-assault policies, John filed a 
sexual-assault complaint against Jane Doe with Occidental. He claimed she did not 
obtain his consent prior to performing oral sex on him—as he doesn’t even recall this 
happening, and nobody ever asked Jane whether she received consent from John, he 
believes it should be subject to the same scrutiny under which he was investigated.” 
Id. Because John would not meet with Occidental’s investigator without his attorney, 
the college refused to consider his complaint. Id. 
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between the Title IX office’s priorities and the rights of 
persons accused of sexual misconduct.112  
• Colleges’ apparent willingness, while denying accused 
respondents the most basic procedural protections, to impose 
the harshest possible sanctions for sexual assault in the 
murkiest cases: where both parties were drinking heavily, 
neither party remembers key facts, and it may actually be 
impossible to determine with anything like reasonable 
confidence which, if either, party to an act of sex committed 
assault on the other.113 
• The apparent willingness to adjudicate such cases under 
the lowest possible standard of proof, again while 
simultaneously and substantially raising the possible 
sanctions upon a finding of responsibility.114  
                                                                                                                                
 
 112.  Harvard University adopted such a system in 2014, prompting a widely 
publicized protest from twenty-eight members of the Harvard Law faculty, who 
collectively wrote: “Among our many concerns [with Harvard’s new sexual 
misconduct policy and procedures] are the following: Harvard has adopted 
procedures for deciding cases of alleged sexual misconduct which lack the most basic 
elements of fairness and due process, are overwhelmingly stacked against the 
accused, and are in no way required by Title IX law or regulation.” See Rethink 
Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment 
-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. The signators’ concerns “include 
but are not limited to the following: [1] The absence of any adequate opportunity to 
discover the facts charged and to confront witnesses and present a defense at an 
adversary hearing. [2] The lodging of the functions of investigation, prosecution, fact-
finding, and appellate review in one office, and the fact that that office is itself a Title 
IX compliance office rather than an entity that could be considered structurally 
impartial.” Id. 
 113.  See generally Dorment, supra note 76 (discussing the Occidental case). 
 114.  See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76–91 (discussing Case 2); see also 
Dorment, supra note 76 (“In a letter rebutting John’s appeal to Occidental, Jane’s 
lawyers wrote, ‘Ms. Jane Doe was raped by . . . John Doe’ . . . which suggests just 
how empty the distinction really is between sexual assault as a breach of student 
conduct and rape as a criminal offense.”). Additionally, according to feminist Law 
Professor Janet Halley of Harvard: “The idea that what we’re talking about here is 
just a civil sanction, the equivalent of money damages, is unreal to me. When we 
expel or suspend a student and put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard 
for that person to go to any other institution of higher education.” Id. Further 
discussing Harvard’s revamped procedure for adjudicating sexual misconduct cases, 
Professor Halley told Esquire: “Every legal lever has been ticked in the direction of 
the accuser and against the [accused] . . . . I think it’s almost in bad faith to be 
arguing that we ‘need’ [the preponderance standard] because we have to get equality 
of the parties. It’s called going too far.” Id. (alteration in original). 
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• The potential for use of Title IX investigations and 
disciplinary sanctions to enforce a particular set of opinions 
about sex and sexual activity on campus and/or to punish 
faculty or students for holding or expressing unpopular views 
on a wide range of issues.115 
It would be unfair to suggest that these procedural faults now 
infect the misconduct codes of all colleges and universities. Thus far, 
and in the absence of a generally accepted set of guidelines, schools 
have mainly been “going at it on their own,” with the result that 
investigation and adjudication procedures in sexual misconduct 
cases vary widely from institution to institution.116 Some systems 
offer relatively strong procedural protections to accused respondents; 
others do not. The problem is that the troubling procedures named 
above do not clearly violate current standards of fair process in the 
context of campus adjudications. The denial or under-emphasizing of 
fundamental tenets of fair process (e.g., notice to an accused person 
of the charges against him or her, a full opportunity to test the 
evidence, and an impartial adjudication by trained personnel) raises 
concern about the system as a whole, even if some colleges have thus 
far succeeded in avoiding such deficits. The process of investigating 
and adjudicating claims that may result in serious punishment must 
not only be fair, it must also be perceived to be fair. Fair process, in 
turn, compels the laying of a sound procedural floor, a minimum set 
                                                                                                                                
 
 115.  See, e.g., Kipnis, supra note 64 (“Title IX officers now adjudicate an 
increasing range of murky situations involving mutual drunkenness, conflicting 
stories, and relationships gone wrong. They pronounce on the thorniest of 
philosophical and psychological issues: What is consent? What is power? Should 
power differentials between romantic partners be proscribed?”); Suk Gersen, supra 
note 62. 
 116.  See, e.g., Gina Maisto Smith & Leslie M. Gomez, The Regional Center for 
Investigation and Adjudication: A Proposed Solution to the Challenges of Title IX 
Investigations in Higher Education, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 27, 29–30 
(“[B]est practice models remain elusive. Even assuming there is a perfect alchemy in 
policy language, [college and university] administrators are clamoring for standards 
of care that serve the needs of complainants, respondents, and institutions . . . .”). 
The American Law Institute is now conducting the “Project on Sexual and Gender-
Based Misconduct on Campus,” which will address a variety of procedural issues 
including the investigation and adjudication of sexual misconduct and sexual assault 
cases. See Student Sexual Misconduct: Procedural Frameworks for Colleges and 
Universities, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/project-sexual-and-
gender-based-misconduct-campus-procedural-frameworks-and-analysis/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2018). 
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of structural protections necessary to produce accurate adjudication 
and when responsibility is duly found, just punishment.  
In the context of campus-based sexual misconduct complaints, 
what protections fit that description? To decide, we need to think 
more deeply about the purposes of such adjudication, the extent to 
which it can do justice of the kind appropriate in an educational 
context, and the structural limits to fair and accurate adjudication 
and punishment in a setting which necessarily lacks the full panoply 
of protections offered to an accused person in court. In Part III, I 
argue that the core principles governing punishment—whether in 
court or in a campus hearing panel—are found in criminal law.   
 
III. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM, PARSIMONY, 
PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Reformists claim that campus misconduct proceedings should 
not be analogized to criminal cases.117 Instead, they claim, these 
adjudications are civil, intra-institutional proceedings involving a 
college’s interpretation of its own code of conduct.118 If the law 
applies at all, under this argument, the appropriate body of doctrine 
is solely on the civil side (Title IX and gender discrimination), not 
the law of rape.119  
It is of course true by definition that college misconduct 
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. But that fact does not 
answer any important questions. No one would argue that since 
college disciplinary procedures are not “legal” in any formal sense, 
such procedures need not concern themselves with fairness or 
accuracy. Fairness and accuracy should be important goals 
whenever institutional punishment is at issue. The real question, 
then, is what rights and procedures must such adjudications include 
in order to make them as fair and accurate as possible? The answer 
need not simply replicate the criminal process. But because they 
involve the potential infliction of serious punishment, college sexual 
misconduct adjudications should hew closely to the core principles 
that have produced that process.  
                                                                                                                                
 
 117.  See, e.g., Alexandra Brodsky, Fair Process, Not Criminal Process, Is the 
Right Way to Address Campus Sexual Assault, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/fair-process-not-criminal-process-right-way-address-
campus-sexual-assault. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. (“School investigations don’t look like trials because they aren’t 
supposed to.”).  
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A. Conflicting Intuitions 
 
Our national conversation about sexual assault on campus 
reflects deep ambivalence about the criminal law of sexual assault. 
Victim advocates argue that colleges must treat sexual assault on 
campus “as the violent felony that it actually is.”120 But they 
simultaneously argue that campus-based adjudication of sexual 
assault cases is not a criminal matter and should therefore eject 
cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming procedural protections—
such as an accused’s rights to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to a 
high standard of proof, and to a formal and impartial hearing—that 
are considered fundamental rights in the criminal setting.121 Jointly, 
these two assertions imply that (1) college sexual misconduct policies 
need not offer the procedural protections that would necessarily 
attend a criminal accusation of rape, but (2) in order to treat sexual 
assault as the “violent felony that it is,”122 they should nonetheless 
impose harsh penalties upon parties found responsible. 
The tension between these two intuitions is easily demonstrated 
by reference to the different levels of procedural protection present 
in the civil and criminal court systems generally. “Due process” is 
relevant in both settings, but means very different things in each.123 
In contrast with the criminal process, civil defendants have fewer 
                                                                                                                                
 
 120.  Cathy Young, New Campus Rape Bill Offers a Better Way, REALCLEAR 
POL. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/08/07/new_ 
campus_rape_bill_offers_a_better_way_127695.html (quoting remarks made by U.S. 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand); see Nicole Hart, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand Talks 
Combating Campus Sexual Assaults, NEWS10 (May 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.news10.com/news/kristen-gillibrand-heads-to-schenectady-to-discuss-
sexual-assault-on-campus/1108076359 (“[T]he senator’s message was loud and clear: 
sexual assault is not okay and will not be tolerated. ‘We need to define this crime for 
the crime that it is,’ she said. ‘Rape is a felony. It is a violent felony.’”). 
 121.  See, e.g., The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, YALE ALUMNI MAG., 
July/Aug. 2015, https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/4105-the-toughest-issue-on-
i-any-i-campus?page=2 (quoting feminist and former federal judge Nancy Gertner: 
“Sexual harassment is not a crime. It is a civil action. And it is covered by university 
policy.”). 
 122.  Young, supra note 120. 
 123.  See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (2006) (“The Supreme Court approaches procedural due process 
quite differently in its criminal and civil decisions, both in how it talks about due 
process and how it conceptualizes what due process requires.”). 
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constitutionally-rooted procedural rights.124 These differences accord 
with the more general principle of proportionality—the idea that 
there should be a proportional relationship between the procedural 
rights accorded to a defendant and the potential consequences of a 
finding of liability. Felony convictions carry the potential for a 
particular kind of stigma and for prison time, punishments that as 
categories we think significantly more serious than the monetary 
compensation which typically results from a finding of civil liability. 
Because they often pose the threat of heavy punishment, “violent 
felonies” in criminal law are carefully defined, investigated by 
professionally-trained personnel who must operate within firmly 
established constitutional and statutory mandates, prosecuted and 
defended by professionally trained advocates, adjudicated under our 
most exacting standard of proof (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) in 
order to minimize the chance of arbitrary or otherwise unjust 
convictions, and punished according to a rule of sentencing 
proportionality that links the sanction imposed to the severity of the 
offense.125 In short, because criminal punishment is especially harsh, 
justice requires that we offer defendants a correspondingly high 
level of procedural protection so we can be sure that convicted 
defendants actually did the crime and deserve the associated 
punishment.126  
                                                                                                                                
 
 124.  See id. at 8 (“[T]he essential element of procedural due process, as clearly 
established in civil settings, is that notice and a hearing must ordinarily precede any 
governmental deprivation of a liberty or property interest.”); id at 9–11 (describing 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and its three-pronged test for procedural 
due process in civil settings); see also supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing 
Mathews and its implications for disciplinary proceedings at public educational 
institutions). 
 125.  See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER 
& RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
186 (9th ed. 2012) (“The requirement that punishment be proportional to the 
seriousness of the offense is a core principle of punishment, both as a central limit 
dictated by the Eighth Amendment, and a statutory statement of purpose in modern 
criminal codes.”); Kuckes, supra note 123, at 18 (reviewing constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of criminal defendants who go to trial and noting that “at trial, a 
criminal defendant receives an impressive degree of ‘process’ constitutionally 
required to adjudicate his guilt or innocence”); Criminal Procedure, LEGAL INFO. 
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_procedure (last visited Nov. 19, 
2018).  
 126.  See, e.g., Criminal Procedure, supra note 125 (“Once a trial begins, the U.S. 
Constitution affords further rights to criminal defendants. Trying to avoid convicting 
an innocent defendant at all costs, the law only permits the prosecution to overcome 
the defendant’s presumption of innocence if they can show the defendant’s guilt 
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B. Campus Sexual Misconduct Tribunals Inflict Punishment 
 
As a threshold matter, it might be necessary to establish the 
proposition that college and university sexual misconduct 
proceedings are, in fact, “punitive” in the sense requisite to the 
central argument here. To those familiar with the debate on this 
issue, it might appear silly to argue otherwise—the intent to punish 
offenders found responsible for sexual assault seems abundantly 
clear.127 “The idea that what we’re talking about [in campus sexual 
assault adjudications] is just a civil sanction, the equivalent of 
money damages, is unreal to me,” notes Professor Janet Halley of 
Harvard Law School.128 “When we expel or suspend a student and 
put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard for that person 
to go to any other institution of higher education.”129   
University sexual misconduct panels are not criminal courts, are 
not necessarily staffed by lawyers or judges, and do not have the 
power to impose prison time on offenders found responsible. 
Nonetheless, sexual misconduct proceedings are clearly punitive—
both in intent and effect. The intent (as well as the primary goal and 
effect) of disciplinary proceedings in college sexual assault cases is to 
inflict penalties on persons found responsible for sexual misconduct. 
Further, such penalties are potentially the most severe sanctions 
available in the college setting—for example, expulsion and 
permanent notation of the findings and sanction on the offender’s 
transcript.130 Finally, such penalties are not meant to “compensate” 
the victim of the assault in the way that tort or contract damages 
are. Instead, they are designed to single out the offender for 
condemnation and punishment.131  
                                                                                                                                
 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This very high burden differs drastically from a civil 
trial’s much lower standard in which the plaintiff must only prove a claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”).  
 127.  See, e.g., Criminal Procedure, supra note 125; see also supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
 128.  Dorment, supra note 76. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  See, e.g., Tovia Smith, Push Grows for a ‘Scarlet Letter’ on Transcripts of 
Campus Sexual Offenders, NPR (May 11, 2016, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/05/11/477656378/push-grows-for-a-scarlet-letter-on-transcri 
pts-of-campus-sexual-offenders (“When it comes to punishing students for campus 
sexual assault, some say kicking offenders out of school isn’t enough. They want 
schools to put a permanent note on offenders’ transcripts explaining that they’ve 
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College administrators sometimes claim that campus misconduct 
proceedings are not constrained by concerns like the presumption of 
innocence or the right to counsel—core elements of the modern 
criminal process—because the sanctions imposed on responsible 
offenders are not “punishment” at all. Instead, they claim, the 
sanctions are a means of rehabilitating offenders and educating 
them in good behavior.132 This argument is not persuasive. To 
“punish” means “to impose a penalty on, for a fault, offense, or 
violation.”133 Criminal punishment can be, and often is, justified as a 
means of educating or “rehabilitating” offenders. College sexual 
misconduct proceedings are punitive because they involve the 
knowing and intentional infliction, by the college and under the 
authority of its code, of painful consequences on the offenders found 
responsible for violating college policy with the deliberate purpose of 
expressing condemnation of the offender and the offense.134 That 
                                                                                                                                
 
been punished for sexual misconduct, so other schools—or employers—can be 
warned.”). 
 132.  Id. “Administrators stress that the college judicial system is . . . ‘not the 
same thing as a court of law.’ . . . Even their mission differs from the criminal justice 
system: Verdicts are educational, not punitive, opportunities. Alleged student victims 
may expect punishment from campus proceedings, says Jerry Price, vice chancellor 
for student affairs at Chapman University, in California, ‘but there is nothing in our 
mission about justice.’” Id.; see, e.g., Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for 
Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/2 
4/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault (last updated July 14, 2014, 5:40 PM) 
(“College administrators stress that the sanctioning in disciplinary matters reflects 
the mission of higher education. Proceedings aren’t meant to punish students, but 
rather to teach them. ‘We’d like to think that we can always educate and hold 
accountable the student,’ says Pamela Freeman, associate dean of students at 
Indiana University. IU officials defended suspending [a respondent in a case at that 
university] as, in effect, a teachable moment.”). 
 133.  Punish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/punish (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 134.  Consider, by analogy, the definition of legal punishment offered by H.L.A. 
Hart: “[T]he standard or central case of ‘punishment’ in terms of five elements: (i) It 
must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. (ii) It must 
be for an offence against legal [here, college or university] rules. (iii) It must be of an 
actual or supposed offender for his offence. (iv) It must be intentionally administered 
by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and administered 
by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed.” H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2008). As for element (v), the analogy to authority 
constituted by college policy is clear. Beyond that, a persuasive argument could be 
made that legal authorities (including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
and its interpretation by the DOE) place college sexual misconduct proceedings 
squarely within Hart’s element (v). See id.; see also Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018); DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, 
supra note 8, at 8. 
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such actions may be also justified by the goal of rehabilitation does 
not distinguish them from punishment. 
Again, campus sexual assault adjudications are not criminal 
trials, and the procedures of criminal law need not be wholly 
imported into such adjudications. But campus proceedings should be 
powerfully influenced by the same concerns about accuracy, 
impartiality, and fairness that animate criminal law. The two 
systems need not share identical procedural rules, but they do share 
the underlying values and principles which produce those specifics. 
Those fundamental principles are the Harm Principle and the 
related principles of Parsimony and Proportionality.135 
 None of what follows is new; most of it, in fact, is so firmly 
instantiated into criminal law that it is usually taken as given. But 
that is really the point. Campus sexual misconduct codes lack a 
coherent set of principles upon which to ground the structure of 
adjudications; such principles do underlie the criminal process, and 
they should serve as a model for other forms of institutional 
punishment. 
 
 C. Centrality of the Harm Principle 
 
Criminal law, of course, spells out the conditions under which 
defendants can be convicted and punished for harming others. But—
and this is crucial to remember in the current context—criminal 
prohibitions do not target the infliction of all harms. Instead, from 
the universe of possible harms that one person might inflict on 
another, the law selects a subset for criminal punishment. Consider 
a basic example. John owns ABC Enterprises, a successful and 
longstanding business which produces and sells widgets. Having 
developed a cheaper and higher-quality widget than John’s, Jane 
establishes XYZ Enterprises directly across the street from John’s 
business. Jane sells her “super-widgets” at a lower price than John’s, 
eventually driving John out of business. Clearly Jane has caused 
“harm” to John (John would certainly think so!), but in deference to 
the perceived social benefits of commercial competition, the law will 
generally not offer redress for that harm. Instead, the law would 
defend Jane’s right to compete with John’s business, even though 
ABC Enterprises came first. John has certainly been harmed by 
Jane, but that harm lacks a legal remedy (and certainly lacks a 
criminal remedy).  
                                                                                                                                
 
 135.  See infra Parts III.D–III.E. 
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This example also illustrates what might be called the “hierarchy 
of harm” with respect to the law. Some harms are not redressable by 
law, period. Some harms—usually those deemed compensable but 
not necessarily punishable—are redressable only by civil suit and 
not by the criminal law. A third set of harms—typically those which 
inflict what we deem to be the most serious injuries to persons or 
property—are redressable by criminal action, an action in which 
society is the plaintiff and sanctions frequently involve 
imprisonment or the threat thereof. Criminal sanctions, therefore, 
constitute a subset of legally redressable harms.   
Return to the above example. Although in general the law does 
not give John the right to stop Jane from competing with him or his 
business, Jane’s right to compete is not limitless. Suppose that, 
instead of simply underselling John, Jane establishes XYZ 
Enterprises across the street from him, begins selling widgets at a 
higher price than John’s, then sends her goons over to burn down 
John’s store, thereby driving John out of business. In that case the 
law would offer John redress, including criminal redress, for 
example via a prosecution against Jane (and the goons) for arson. 
The important thing to notice is that the different outcome in the 
two situations does not hinge on the existence or absence of harm; 
John has been “harmed” in both scenarios. The difference hinges on 
the law’s decision as to which kind of harm will be legally (including 
criminally) protected—in other words, which party has the legal 
right to protection from the other. Because the law views 
competition as presumptively beneficial, in the former case it sides 
with Jane: Jane harmed John but did not violate his rights. In the 
latter case, however, Jane engaged in methods of competition which 
are deemed not socially beneficial and so the legal right shifts to 
John—in that case the harm Jane inflicted did violate John’s rights 
(by using arson, rather than sales of cheaper widgets, to drive John 
out of business), and the violation was serious enough to be a 
criminal wrong. Jane may harm John by selling a better product at a 
lower price and thereby driving him out of business, but she may not 
legally harm him by burning down his store to drive him out of 
business. Another way to say the same thing: I have the right to 
compete against you by making and selling a superior product, even 
if that competition harms you by winning away your customers. I do 
not have the right to intentionally destroy your property, even if my 
motive in doing so is exactly the same—to win your customers. 
Thus, only some harms generate rights that are the subject of 
criminal prohibitions, and for violation of which the criminal law will 
punish guilty defendants. The rights which it so defends are those 
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which (1) society accepts as legitimate bases for state-inflicted 
punishment and (2) are feasibly definable, provable, and enforceable 
by the courts.136 And for present purposes we need only agree that, 
whatever the complete list of criminally actionable “rights,” the right 
to be free from undeserved physical harm—which certainly includes 
the right not be sexually abused or assaulted—is among them. 
Criminal law (not exclusively, but in particular) punishes those who 
commit, or threaten to commit, serious physical assaults on others. 
It thereby defends the presumptive right of individuals not to be 
physically assaulted or threatened with such assault. How far such 
protection extends—a question which requires a closer definition of 
“sexual assault”—is a question we will take up later.137 
Next, it is firmly established in our judicial system that criminal 
punishment is justified only if the person who causes harm is 
blameworthy for doing so. Harm done to another in self-defense, or 
that results from other excusable or justifiable circumstances, is not 
punishable; harm done negligently—that is, without conscious 
purpose, knowledge, or knowledge of risk that the harm might result 
from the defendant’s conduct—is either not punishable at all, or 
punishable only if the defendant’s negligence reaches beyond that 
required in the civil sphere.138 And harm done without moral fault—
                                                                                                                                
 
 136.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge to Criminal Law, 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2182 (1995). Professor Schulhofer effectively captures the first of 
these elements in the related civil context of sexual harassment: “[I]f a supervisor 
tries to get sexual favors by offering a promotion (or by threatening to veto one), he is 
confronting the employee with alternatives (no matter whether we call them offers or 
threats) that his position gives him no right to impose. If the supervisor used his 
position to get an economic payoff from the employee, he would be guilty of extortion. 
If a professor threatened to withhold a good grade or a good recommendation until he 
got some cash from a student, again he would be guilty of extortion. The worker or 
student should have the same right to control her sexuality that she has to control 
her wages or her bank account. . . . What makes the [woman’s] consent invalid is 
that rules already settled in our culture deny the supervisor the right to require an 
employee to choose between her promotion and her legally protected interests. . . . 
For the same reason, the high school principal who allegedly obtained sex from a 
student by threatening to block her graduation should certainly be guilty of a crime.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 137.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 138.  See, e.g., Rex v. Bateman, 133 LT 730, 732 (1925) (“In explaining to juries 
the test which they should apply to determine whether the negligence, in the 
particular case, amounted or did not amount to a crime, judges have used many 
epithets such as ‘culpable,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘gross,’ ‘wicked,’ ‘clear,’ ‘complete.’ But, 
whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish 
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the 
negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between 
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strict liability harms—are limited to minor offenses or those which 
fit into the well-defined category of “public-welfare” offenses.139 To be 
criminally punishable, the person who inflicts a criminally-
prohibited harm must, at the time they acted, have had some 
culpable knowledge or very good reason to have possessed such 
knowledge that the person’s conduct would cause the harm.140  
Finally, the law (including criminal law) punishes only those 
harms which are objectively provable. This is a reality which has 
particular import for sexual crimes, which often possess the twin 
characteristics of inflicting a large amount of harm on the victim 
while also offering a relatively small amount of corroborative 
evidence, such as testimony from third parties outside of the 
recollections and accounts of the parties to the sexual encounter. The 
law requires that the burden of proof be placed upon the 
complainant, that the standard of proof be sufficient to convince 
impartial observers that the harm happened, and that the person 
charged possessed the relevant culpable mental state while 
committing it.141 
The principles that the law punishes only that subset of provable 
harms which violate certain rights, and only when a defendant 
deserves blame for doing so, apply in the context of personal 
(including sexually intimate) relationships. In the commercial 
sphere, the principle of open competition sets the background to 
business dealings, denying John recovery when Jane harms his 
business simply by making and selling cheaper widgets. In the arena 
of personal relationships, the analogous default principle is that of 
individual autonomy—according to which adult people are free to 
decide with whom they want to be in a relationship and how they 
want that relationship to be conducted.142 Within the fairly broad 
                                                                                                                                
 
subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a 
crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.”). 
 139.  See, e.g., Richard J. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 732 (1960) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 
33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 83 (1955)). 
 140.  1 FRANCES WHARTON ET AL., WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. 
1978).  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2182. Professor Schulhofer expressed: 
“[W]hat if a woman does agree [to sex]? What kinds of constraints violate her 
autonomy? Autonomy cannot mean freedom from all constraints upon choice, but it 
does entail freedom from those constraints that our culture identifies as illegitimate. 
The scope of that freedom is marked by the rights to bodily integrity and personal 
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boundaries set by laws which criminalize fraud, assault, and so 
forth, we allow people to run their personal lives, including their 
sexual lives, in the way they see fit—even if they suffer harm in the 
process. In the course of human relationships people are 
(unfortunately) lied to, cheated, manipulated, insulted, and treated 
badly. Relationships, in short, can be harmful. Generally, however, 
we do not punish people criminally for harmful things they do in 
personal relationships unless those behaviors clearly violate another 
person’s physical autonomy or would constitute a crime 
(embezzlement or fraud, for example) in an arms-length transaction. 
The law thus creates a strong presumption against state 
intervention and punishment, even in cases which indisputably 
result in harm.143  
Under this conception of rights, if A credibly says to B, “Have sex 
with me or I’ll kill you,” and B has sex with A because of A’s threat, 
A has violated B’s rights and has committed punishable sexual 
assault.144 If, on the other hand, A says to B, “Have sex with me or 
I’ll break up with you,” that may not be very nice of A, but it violates 
no right of B’s. Outside of special status relationships such as 
marriage or parenthood, B does not have the right to compel A to 
have a relationship with her, to stay in that relationship, or to 
acquire her consent to end it. The right lies on the other side: both A 
and B have the presumptive right to leave their relationship for any 
                                                                                                                                
 
independence that existing legal principles already protect. This modest conception 
of personal autonomy offers boundaries that are specific and, yet, far reaching.” Id. 
 143.  So, for example, domestic violence laws prohibit intimate partners from 
using force (or threats of force) to dominate each other in a relationship, but do not 
generally prohibit them from lying to each other, saying hurtful things, being 
unreasonably demanding or selfish, etc. In general, harms given and received in 
relationships that are not independently criminal and do not involve special status, 
physical injury, or threats of physical injury, are not criminally actionable. See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (2018) (“‘Domestic Violence’ means any assault, aggravated 
assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, 
kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury 
or death of one family or household member by another family or household 
member.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) (providing that a defendant commits “rape” when he “has sexual 
intercourse with a female not his wife” and “he compels her to submit by force or by 
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be 
inflicted on anyone”); id. § 213.2 (providing that a defendant commits “gross sexual 
imposition” when he “has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife” and “he 
compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of 
ordinary resolution”). 
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reason or no reason at all. A can leave B because B will not have sex 
with A, or because A met somebody richer or prettier or smarter or 
blonder or taller or shorter or heavier or lighter or . . . for any 
reason. Although we might say that some of those reasons are fairly 
paltry in a moral sense (good riddance to A, if he leaves B because of 
them), the criminal law will not punish A for threatening to act or 
for acting upon them. In such a situation, A may have harmed B in 
the sense that B is now faced with the hard choice of either having 
sex with A when he or she would rather not, or doing without A 
entirely, which by hypothesis, B does not want to do either. However 
tough that may be emotionally, and whatever moral judgments we 
may be inclined to pass upon A, A has not committed a criminally 
punishable offense. 
Stephen Schulhofer usefully compares two cases: (1) a highly 
paid fashion model who consents to sex with a casting director in 
order to further her acting career, and (2) “a needy mother of four 
who finds a partner willing to support her.”145 The model’s autonomy 
has been violated by the director because “[t]here is an improper 
constraint on the woman’s freedom of choice under background 
rights that are already settled in our culture.”146 In the “hard case” 
of the needy mother, on the other hand, if the man threatens to kick 
her out of the house unless she continues to satisfy him sexually, 
that threat may not be legally actionable: 
 
Obviously, the needy mother has far less freedom of choice 
than the successful fashion model does. But the relevant 
question has to be whether the man’s threatened actions are 
illicit. In the model’s situation, the pressure may be slight, 
but it is clearly impermissible. In the mother’s case, the 
pressure, though severe, might not be illicit. A sexual quid 
pro quo is not a legitimate condition of ordinary employment, 
but sexual fulfillment is, for both men and women, an 
appropriate and valued goal of ongoing, intimate personal 
relationships. Thus, although the man’s action in imposing a 
sexual condition on his willingness to continue his 
relationship with the needy mother could be criticized as 
insensitive in many contexts, it nonetheless involves an 
exercise of his autonomy that society ordinarily considers 
legitimate and worthy of social protection. . . . [I]f existing 
norms do not protect her from this sort of economic pressure, 
                                                                                                                                
 
 145.  Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2183. 
 146.  Id. 
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then her decision to remain in the relationship, although 
highly constrained, is not improperly tainted, and her 
consent to sex would therefore be valid. . . . The key is in the 
background structure of rights and privileges that determine 
what uses of personal power and institutional position are 
permissible, against either the weak or the strong, against 
either men or women in our society.147  
 
Under this conception of criminal law, a fair number of morally 
egregious cases would not be criminally actionable. Suppose, for 
example, that Bill and Barb are sexually involved. Barb is unhappy 
and wants to end the relationship, and to prevent her from leaving, 
Bill credibly threatens, “If you leave me, I will kill you.” In this case 
Bill has clearly and believably threatened Barb with grave physical 
harm and has thus violated her rights in a way that constitutes 
criminal coercion.148 But suppose, instead, that Bill threatens, “If 
you leave me, I will kill myself.” Again, most of us would make 
negative moral judgments about this behavior—it is manipulative, 
exploitive, etc. But in contrast to the prior example, the threat in 
this second instance should not be criminally actionable. Despite the 
fact that such manipulation might well cause harm to Barb (either 
by preventing her from leaving the relationship or if she leaves and 
Bill follows through with his threat, causing her to feel guilty for his 
demise), it is a threat of harm to one’s self, not another. Thus, it 
violates no legally cognizable rights (Bill has no legal right of 
protection against a threat of self-harm).  
In sum, the intentional infliction of harm, by itself, is not 
criminally punishable. To “qualify” for punishment, the inflicted 
harm must violate (or credibly threaten to violate) the harmed 
person’s rights, including his or her right to personal physical 
security. Clearly, a system structured in this way will leave many 
harms unredressable by the law of punishment.  
  
                                                                                                                                
 
 147.  Id. at 2183–84 (third emphasis added). 
 148.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1). 
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D. The Principle of Parsimony 
 
Why does the law, and in particular the criminal law, operate in 
this parsimonious way? Why punish only harms that violate, or 
credibly threaten to violate, a person’s physical autonomy? Why not 
punish all morally egregious conduct (such as a threat to eject a 
person from your house unless they have sex with you or a threat to 
commit suicide if the other person leaves the relationship) if such 
conduct in fact pressures a person into doing something that they 
would not otherwise do? Or, perhaps we should consider the mirror 
image of this question: why not adopt a much more expansive vision 
of the legally defensible rights of persons in a relationship? 
Shouldn’t the law recognize and enforce the widow’s right not to be 
forced into a choice between sex and a safe home, and Barb’s right 
not to be subjected to Bill’s manipulative threats to harm himself if 
she exercises her autonomous choice to end their relationship? 
Stating the question may suggest the right answer. Criminal 
enforcement of morality at such a micro-level would probably be 
impossible and could easily become tyrannical. We are not willing to 
devote the resources or accept the degree of state intrusion that 
would be necessary in order to protect people from all the emotional 
harms that arise in personal relationships. In the personal arena, 
the law of punishment sets broad boundaries, prohibiting physical 
harms and the credible threat of such harms. Within those 
boundaries the law generally leaves it to individuals to run their 
own lives and defend their own autonomy.149 We punish only the 
most serious harms, and in the area of personal relationships, we 
generally deem those to be actual or credibly threatened harms to 
the physical autonomy of the person.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 149.  For an interesting discussion of the traditional boundaries of criminal law 
in this respect and recent attempts to change them, see generally Avlana K. 
Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 607 (2015) 
(noting that criminal law traditionally has implicitly acknowledged emotional harm 
but has not made such harm an element of criminal liability and arguing that recent 
“Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress” statutes, which break with this tradition, 
are problematic). 
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E. Parsimony and Proportionality 
 
This parsimonious definition of rights, in turn, is conceptually 
parallel to the principle of proportional punishment. According to the 
latter, criminal punishment must be proportional to the degree of 
harm inflicted by the offense, and in the context of state-imposed 
punishment, proportionality is the view that criminal “penalties 
[should] be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the 
defendant’s criminal conduct.”150 The proportionality maxim was 
famously articulated by Jeremy Bentham in his Principles of Penal 
Law.151 In Bentham’s utilitarian view, criminal punishment is 
presumptively an evil because it involves the deliberate infliction of 
suffering on a convicted person.152 Because punishment is an evil it 
should be minimized, by which Bentham meant that criminal 
penalties should (1) not be inflicted at all unless necessary, and (2) 
when necessary, should be carefully gauged by the seriousness of the 
criminal’s offense.153 Of course, proportionality is also an important 
element in retributive theories of punishment, which hold that a 
person may not be punished to an extent that is greater than he or 
                                                                                                                                
 
 150.  Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 
CRIME & JUST. 55, 55 (1992) (noting, also, that “[t]he principle of proportionality . . . 
seems to be a basic requirement of fairness”). 
 151.  JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1771), reprinted in THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 367, 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also Alice 
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 
276–77 (2005) (discussing Bentham’s view of proportionality as a principle in 
criminal punishment). 
 152.  BENTHAM, supra note 151, at 399, 401. 
 153.  Id. In relevant part, Bentham articulated the rule of proportionality in 
terms of constraints on both the minimum and maximum punishment allowed in the 
criminal setting. Id. “Punishments may be too small or too great; and there are 
reasons for not making them too small, as well as for not making them too great. . . . 
[As to the need for minimums:] If, then, a man, having reaped the profit of a crime, 
and undergone the punishment, finds the former more than equivalent to the latter, 
he will go on offending for ever; there is nothing to restrain him. If those, also, who 
behold him, reckon that the balance of gain is in favor of the delinquent, the 
punishment will be useless for the purposes of example.” Id. at 399. As to the need 
for maximums: “The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary 
to bring it into conformity with the rules here given. . . . An error on the maximum 
side . . . is that to which legislators and men in general are naturally inclined: 
antipathy, or a want of compassion for individuals who are represented as dangerous 
and vile, pushes them onward to an undue severity. It is on this side, therefore, that 
we should take the most precautions, as on this side there has been shown the greatest 
disposition to err.” Id. at 401 (emphasis added). 
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she deserves, with desert measured by the seriousness of the offense 
he or she committed.154 
The three principles of Harm, Parsimony, and Proportionality 
are the basic building blocks of the criminal model of adjudication. 
Part IV of this Article applies these principles in the setting of 
sexual assault on campus, demonstrating their usefulness in 
establishing a procedural framework for the adjudication of 
individual cases. First, however, it will be important to clarify a key 
distinction between two different functions of college codes of 
conduct.  
 
F. Distinguishing Aspiration from Punishment 
 
Unlike criminal law, which mostly sketches society’s moral code 
in a negative sense through prohibitions and punishments, college 
codes of conduct usually have a dual function: (1) they prohibit 
certain conduct and contain disciplinary procedures for code 
violations; and (2) they articulate affirmative ideals—of community, 
civility, and equal respect—that they seek to impart independently 
of the disciplinary code. The second, affirmative function of college 
codes retains a vestige of the in loco parentis role that colleges and 
universities filled for many generations.155  
In the realm of campus sexual misconduct codes, these two roles 
have sometimes become confused, to the detriment of the 
conversation about sexual assault on campus. In fact, it is important 
to clearly distinguish them and to realize that the sanctioning 
process that inevitably attends sexual misconduct adjudications does 
not necessarily attach to the more aspirational sections of student 
codes of conduct.  
A major goal of college and university student conduct codes is to 
articulate a set of aspirations and behavioral ideals toward which 
members of the community are expected to strive. In contrast to 
criminal law’s focus on prohibitions, campus codes often declare the 
affirmative norms by which the community seeks to operate—norms 
of mutual respect, toleration, honesty, and integrity. These norms 
                                                                                                                                
 
 154.  See, e.g., HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 436 (1979) 
(“[T]he requirement that punishment not be disproportionately great . . . is dictated 
by the same principle that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any 
punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment 
without guilt.”). 
 155.  See generally Theodore C. Stamatakos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, 
Tort Liability, and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471 (1990) 
(discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis in a collegiate setting). 
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express the values necessary for an academic community to function 
well. They also acknowledge a traditional role of the university, the 
sense that part of its job is to continue the character education of 
young adults as well as their academic training. Thus, college 
conduct codes are replete with exhortatory statements:  
 
• “[A]ll student members of the University community are 
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that 
demonstrates mutual respect for the rights and 
personal/academic well-being of others, preserves the 
integrity of the social and academic environment, and 
supports the mission of the University.”156  
• “Students at Carnegie Mellon, because they are members 
of an academic community dedicated to the achievement of 
excellence, are expected to meet the highest standards of 
personal, ethical and moral conduct possible. These 
standards require personal integrity, a commitment to 
honesty without compromise, as well as truth without 
equivocation and a willingness to place the good of the 
community above the good of the self . . . . It is rare that the 
life of a student in an academic community can be so private 
that it will not affect the community as a whole or that the 
above standards do not apply.”157  
• “Bruins are committed to the values of Respect, 
Accountability, Integrity, Service and Excellence. Bruins 
conduct themselves with integrity and understand that the 
quality of their educational experience is predicated on the 
quality of their academic work and service to the community. 
Bruins hold themselves accountable to the commitments they 
make and for their conduct. When faced with adversity, 
Bruins engage in thoughtful reflection and exhibit superior 
ethical decision-making skills.”158  
Such statements do not define specific conduct violations that 
will result in punishment. No college could (or would) punish every 
word or behavior by a student which does not “support the mission of 
                                                                                                                                
 
 156.  Academic Integrity, N.Y.U. SHANGHAI, https://shanghai.nyu.edu/content/ 
academic-integrity (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 157.  Carnegie Mellon Code, CARNEGIE MELLON U., https://www.cmu.edu/stud 
ent-affairs/theword/code/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 158.  UCLA Student Conduct Code, UCLA, https://www.deanofstudents.ucla. 
edu/Individual-Student-Code (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
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the university,”159 “place the good of the community above the good 
of the self,”160 or demonstrate “thoughtful reflection and . . . superior 
ethical decision-making skills.”161 Such exhortations are not meant 
to articulate standards of formal punishment, but rather a 
behavioral ideal toward which students should strive. They serve 
purposes which are mainly pedagogical and developmental rather 
than punitive. A university’s code of punishment—the rules 
specifying misconduct which are adjudicated by college misconduct 
panels—on the other hand, pertains only to a small subset of 
violations, violations (prominently including sexual assault) which 
are deemed to cause large and unjustified harm. The three principles 
articulated above—harm, parsimony and proportionality—mark and 
enforce the conceptual boundary between the realms of aspiration 
and permissible punishment in campus codes of conduct.  
Both the aspirational and punitive roles of student conduct codes 
apply to their dictates about personal relationships—including 
sexual relationships. The statement in a college code of conduct that 
“[a]ll members of the University community have a right to 
treatment with dignity and respect and to full participation in the 
community”162 cannot reasonably be interpreted as a declaration 
that any violation of that ideal—any instance of disrespect or 
unfairness in personal relationships between students—will be 
adjudicated and punished in a disciplinary proceeding. For the same 
reason that society does not punish all harms via criminal law, 
universities should not, and cannot, punish all morally flawed 
behaviors which occur between students involved in personal 
relationships, including intimate relationships. A student who 
“cheats” on an intimate partner by flirting with someone else, or 
calls an intimate partner hurtful names during a fight, or says mean 
things about an intimate partner behind his or her back—all 
violations of respect and fair dealing which people commit in 
intimate relationships all the time—should not be subject to formal 
disciplinary proceedings and sanctions for violating his or her code of 
conduct. 
In their critique of the “sex bureaucracy” now encircling higher 
education, Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk recount some wonderful 
                                                                                                                                
 
 159.  Academic Integrity, supra note 156. 
 160.  Carnegie Mellon Code, supra note 157. 
 161.  UCLA Student Conduct Code, supra note 158. 
 162.  Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard Community, 
HARV. U., http://static.fas.harvard.edu/registrar/ugrad_handbook/current/chapter5/ 
standards_conduct.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
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examples of what they call “bureaucratic sex creep” in this area.163 
They quote from a number of college and university conduct codes 
which purport to teach students how to have healthy romantic and 
sexual relationships.164 In 2015, for example, Georgia Southern 
University instructed students: “[Sexual c]onsent is a voluntary, 
sober, imaginative, enthusiastic, creative, wanted, informed, mutual, 
honest, and verbal agreement.”165 The 2014 Annual Security Report 
from American University outlines “the difference between healthy 
and unhealthy relationships,”166 while the consent materials from 
the University of Wyoming urge students, “Don’t Kill the Mood,” 
explaining that “[a]sking for consent . . . shows your creativity and 
can even make the sexual interaction more intimate.”167  
As standards for adjudications of misconduct, such exhortations 
obviously make no sense. No school would seriously entertain the 
charge that a respondent should be disciplined for misconduct 
because they were insufficiently “creative” or “imaginative” in 
procuring consent. Such instructions are not meant to spell out 
grounds for a misconduct charge but rather to teach students about 
healthy relationships, especially healthy sexual relationships.168  
 Those who create and who implement campus codes of sexual 
misconduct must recognize the distinction between the aspirational 
and the punitive. Just as the principles of parsimony and 
proportionality restrict criminal prohibitions to a subset of wrongful 
acts, misconduct prohibitions in campus codes reach only a relatively 
small set of provable, serious (and therefore punishable) harms. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 163.  Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 925–30. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. at 925–26 (quoting GA. S. UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 39 (2015), 
http://perma.cc./8NQF-SEQY). 
 166.  Id. at 927 (quoting AM. UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 31 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/6GWT-RJVV). 
 167.  Id. at 928 (quoting UNIV. OF WYO., WHERE IS YOUR LINE: CONSENT IS 
SEXY, https://perma.cc/45FK-BQRQ). 
 168.  Admittedly, some college consent materials may venture too far even as 
aspirational guides. See, e.g., id. at 929 (quoting consent materials from the 
University of Wyoming, in which students who want to “Make Consent Fun” are 
offered “some more colorful suggestions for a script: Baby, you want to make a bunk 
bed: me on top, you on bottom? May I pleasure you with my tongue? Would you like 
to try an Australian kiss? It’s like a French kiss, but ‘Down Under.’ I’ve got the ship. 
You’ve got the harbor. Can I dock for the night?”). 
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G. Three Common Principles 
 
Collectively, the harm, parsimony, and proportionality principles 
set a baseline standard for the criminal process. In the context of 
personal relationships, they instruct (1) that criminal law will not 
punish all harms but only certain harms (typically those which 
violate or credibly threaten to violate the physical security of other 
persons); (2) that punishment, the deliberate infliction of suffering 
on a convicted defendant, must be justified by legitimate purposes 
(e.g., desert and/or utility) and will only be inflicted for serious 
offenses that violate important rights as society understands them; 
and (3) that punishment must not exceed, in nature or degree, the 
just deserts of the convicted defendant as gauged, again, by the 
seriousness of the crime he or she committed.169 To the extent that 
the law of punishment follows these principles, we recognize it to be 
just and fair. Further, the procedural rights and protections we call 
“due process” in the criminal context are strategies which help to 
ensure that these meta-goals of the process—that punishment be 
inflicted only for the harmful violation of rights, that it not be 
inflicted on the undeserving, and that it be inflicted only to the 
degree deserved by the guilt of the defendant—are achieved to the 
maximum extent possible.  
What might be called the criminal law model of punishment in 
this context is just this: the presence of these three related principles 
combined with a method of balancing them which allows for charges 
of sexual assault to be heard, for the person charged to have a full 
and fair opportunity to mount a defense, and for the adjudication 
process to thus produce accurate, transparent, and fair results. Out 
of a desire to maximize accuracy and prevent unjust convictions, our 
balancing method has produced certain core rules and presumptions: 
 
• The presumption of innocence, requiring the state to 
prove guilt according to clear standards—the more serious 
the charge, the higher the standard of proof; 
• Statutes of limitation, requiring that criminal 
prosecutions for most offenses be brought within a specified 
time period, based on the theory that over time key evidence 
becomes lost or corrupted, witnesses disappear or forget, and 
the chance of inaccurate decision-making rises accordingly; 
                                                                                                                                
 
 169.  With the degree of seriousness measured by the degree of harm inflicted, or 
credibly threatened, to the physical autonomy of other persons. 
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• Advance notice to accused defendants accompanied by a 
full explanation of the charges against them; 
• Clear definitions of criminal prohibitions, a way of giving 
notice to the public of what conduct would render them 
subject to prosecution; 
• An impartial process adjudicated by trained personnel 
who are thoroughly familiar with the appropriate rules and 
standards; 
• Transparency—both in terms of clarity of the rules and 
openness of the process to the parties and, where 
appropriate, to the public—so that errors can be seen and 
corrected as quickly as possible. 
Criminal law offers one functional model of the harm, 
parsimony, and proportionality principles at work in a system of 
punishment which seeks to do justice. But the model also presents a 
structure and framework that can be applied to any system of 
punishment. Part IV of this Article applies the framework to the 
problem of adjudicating sexual assault on campus. 
 
IV. THE MODEL APPLIED TO CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
 
The foregoing does not require that every system of punishment 
must precisely mirror criminal law or replicate its methods of 
balancing the three principles. Setting and context matter; and the 
particular procedures required may vary with differences in both. 
The Supreme Court dictates that due process is necessarily a flexible 
concept, sensitive to the particular situation in which the need for 
protection of rights arises. Where the three core principles are 
respected, and the process “due” to a defendant follows from them 
and keeps them in a proper balance, a system of punishment can 
consistently meet the demands of justice.   
How should the balance be struck in cases of sexual misconduct 
and sexual assault on campus? 
 
A. The Criminal Law Model in Context 
 
Recall the model’s basic conceptual framework. Its animating 
principles derive from a background respect for the autonomy of the 
individual person.170 Criminal punishment is justifiable only when 
an offender has inflicted serious harm that violates the rights of 
                                                                                                                                
 
 170.  See supra text accompanying note 142. 
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others, and only to the degree merited by the gravity of the 
offense.171 Further, rights in relationships are defined against a 
background assumption that, absent physical harm or the threat of 
such harm, people should generally be allowed to enter, conduct, and 
leave personal relationships in the ways, and for the reasons, that 
they choose.172  
This autonomy principle argues for a vigorous response to 
serious assaults on the person, such as sexual assault.173 People 
have the right not to be physically forced into having sex or sexual 
contact, and not to be coerced into having sex or sexual contact by 
otherwise illegal means (e.g., as the price of their physical freedom, 
of someone else’s physical freedom, of getting a good grade, a 
promotion, or a job, or of retaining their privacy against the threat of 
exposure).174 Further, if A has sex with B, knowing that B is not 
consenting or is reckless with respect to B’s consent, then A has 
violated B’s rights whether or not A uses or threatens to use force or 
coercion, and A should be found responsible for sexual misconduct. 
Punishment is permissible only when (1) the perpetrator caused 
harm that violated the victim’s rights; (2) the perpetrator caused 
such harm in a morally culpable way; and (3) that harm is provable 
under a clearly defined standard.175 
The autonomy principle also argues for the maximum possible 
protection against unjust conviction and punishment and a number 
of procedural rights proceed from that premise. Unjust punishment 
can seriously interfere with the autonomy of the wrongly convicted 
person and serves no legitimate interest of the victim. Persons 
                                                                                                                                
 
 171.  See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 172.  See supra text accompanying note 142. 
 173.  See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2003), in KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 186, 369, 371 (9th ed. 
2012) (“The basic principle which is truly common to [the reviewed] legal systems is 
that serious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised. Sexual autonomy is 
violated wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it . . . .” 
(alteration in original)). 
 174.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1–213.2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 1962) (discussing the definition of “rape” and “gross sexual 
imposition”). 
 175.  See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2003), in KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 186, 369, 372 (9th ed. 
2012) (“[T]he actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by . . . 
sexual penetration . . . where [it] occurs without . . . consent given voluntarily, as a 
result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and 
the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”). 
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charged with serious offenses—offenses which carry the potential for 
punishment—have the right to a fair and accurate assessment of the 
evidence against them. Fair and accurate assessment, in turn, 
requires that certain threshold rules be firmly in place.  
 
1.  Clearly Defined Offenses 
 
First, the offenses at issue must be clearly, carefully, and 
transparently defined so that all members of the community 
understand what actions violate the sexual misconduct standard and 
under what conditions the standard will apply. Thus, campus 
misconduct codes must make valid distinctions between their 
aspirational and punitive dimensions—neither seeking to punish 
students for violating such amorphous duties as “support[ing] the 
mission of the university,”176 nor withholding punishment that is 
otherwise justified on the grounds that the mission of the institution 
is to educate and not to punish.177 
Campus sexual misconduct codes must clearly define the 
meaning of “sexual harassment” under Title IX, and must also 
clearly and publicly define, ex ante, the elements of sexual 
misconduct offenses. In this connection, such terms as “affirmative 
consent” and “incapacitation”—core elements in most of the new 
campus sexual misconduct codes—should be defined so as to 
explicitly mark the boundary between permissible and actionable 
behavior. Too often they are not. 
Serious concerns have been raised about the fairness and 
accuracy of the affirmative consent standard, which is now imposed 
by law on colleges and universities in California and other states.178 
The strength of affirmative consent standards is that they put 
sexual autonomy front and center. Stephen Schulhofer has described 
this virtue well: 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 176.  Academic Integrity, supra note 156. 
 177.  Lombardi, supra note 132. 
 178.  See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (West 2018) (“‘Affirmative consent’ 
means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. 
It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he 
or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual 
activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean 
consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can 
be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons 
involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be 
assumed to be an indicator of consent.”).  
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‘No’ means no, obviously. But an intrusion on the person 
requires more than just the absence of a clear ‘no.’ A physical 
intrusion on the person requires actual permission. Would 
anyone think that a medical patient’s ambivalence, or an 
ambiguous ‘maybe,’ was a consent to medical treatment or 
surgery? Obviously, anything less than clear affirmative 
permission would never count as consent. . . . Why should the 
physical autonomy of a woman’s body not be entitled to the 
same respect in a sexual encounter? . . . Consent for an 
intimate physical intrusion into the body should mean in 
sexual interactions what it means in every other context—
affirmative permission clearly signaled by words or 
conduct.179 
 
In the context of institutional punishment, however, the concerns 
about affirmative consent are at least equally powerful. In relevant 
part, for example, the California affirmative consent statute reads as 
follows: “Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual 
activity and can be revoked at any time.”180 As an aspirational ideal, 
this statement has obvious value. But as a basis for punishment, it 
is deeply problematic, especially in the context of a college 
disciplinary proceeding that requires only a preponderance standard 
to prove a violation and is conducted by personnel who typically have 
little or no training in adjudication.181 The cases discussed earlier 
illustrate the potential injustice of the standard.182 As a practical 
matter, how is a person accused of sexual assault under an 
affirmative consent standard to prove that he or she obtained 
“ongoing” affirmative consent in a sexual encounter witnessed only 
by the two parties to the sex? What does “ongoing” mean? That each 
person must obtain consent at certain stages of their sexual 
                                                                                                                                
 
 179.  Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2181. As to the details of his proposed 
affirmative consent standard, and its workability, Professor Schulhofer argues: 
“Clear proof of an unequivocal ‘no’ should not be required. . . . There are many ways 
to make permission clear without verbalizing the word ‘yes,’ and permission 
certainly need not be in writing. But permission must be an affirmative indication of 
actual willingness. Silence and ambivalence are not permission.” Id.  
 180.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386. 
 181.  See id. (All California institutions of higher education, in order to receive 
state funds for student financial assistance, “shall adopt a policy concerning sexual 
assault . . . . The policy shall include . . . [a] policy that the standard used in 
determining whether the elements of the complaint against the accused have been 
demonstrated is the preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 182.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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encounter? If so, what stages are those? What constitutes 
“revocation” of consent? Certainly, a verbal “no” should be enough, 
but affirmative consent statutes do not require this. Does the 
affirmative consent statute upend the presumption of innocence that 
forces the party bringing the charge to prove the case against the 
accused? Some believe that it does—that the standard, in effect, 
mandates a finding of sexual assault unless the accused can prove 
that he or she obtained ongoing consent in whatever way that term 
is defined by the adjudicator.183 Until these questions are answered, 
it will be at least unclear whether the standard accurately targets 
only parties who have violated the sexual rights of other persons or 
whether, instead, it has made a lot of non-actionable conduct subject 
to serious disciplinary action and punishment.  
Similar problems attend the definition of “incapacitation,” and 
its relationship to “consent,” in many college codes. It is clearly 
appropriate for a system of punishment to prohibit sexual contact 
with a person who is “incapacitated” because he or she was sleeping 
or unconscious at the time of the contact.184 The Codes often go well 
beyond that, however, enabling charges of sexual misconduct when 
one or both parties may be intoxicated but still able to walk, speak 
coherently, etc. and leaving it to misconduct panels in individual 
cases to decide, ex post and (again) under the lowest possible 
standard of proof, what “incapacitation” really means.185 It is true 
                                                                                                                                
 
 183.  See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not Under ‘Yes 
Means Yes.’, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2015/10/14/how-affirmative-consent-rules-put-principles-of-fairness-at-
risk/ (opposing college affirmative consent standard on ground of fairness to the 
accused; “it is better for [ten] individuals who did not obtain consent to go free than 
for even one individual who did obtain consent to be wrongfully punished. Being 
wrongfully punished can be catastrophic for a student.”). Here, Dershowitz also 
delineates the important difference between the aspiration and punitive aspects of 
college conduct codes: “I believe that there are two separate, often overlapping, 
issues with regard to consent. One involves individual behavior, an area in which 
affirmative consent could be a helpful standard. The second, however, concerns our 
legal system—where punishing alleged violations of such stringent rules without due 
process may tarnish our principles of fairness.” Id. On the first (aspirational) side, 
Dershowitz approves of the affirmative consent standard; on the second (legal) side, 
he opposes the affirmative consent standard on the grounds that punishing someone 
under it is unfair to the accused person. Id. 
 184.  See, e.g., Liam Stack, Outrage Over Sentencing in Rape Case at Stanford, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2016, at A15 (describing facts of the case and the controversy 
surrounding Brock Turner’s sentence). 
 185.  See, e.g., T. Rees Shapiro, He Said It Was Consensual. She Said She 
Blacked Out. U-Va. Had to Decide: Was It Assault?, WASH. POST (July 14, 2016), 
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that many codes contain a reasonableness provision under which the 
accused may defend against a charge of sexual assault on the 
grounds that he or she reasonably believed that the other person 
was not incapacitated. But what counts as “reasonable” or 
“unreasonable” behavior in these circumstances, particularly when 
the definitions of “consent” and “incapacitation” may be murky, is far 
from clear.186 Adjudicators require some discretion in applying 
general standards to a particular set of facts. But to achieve a 
procedural standard which honors the principles of harm, 
parsimony, and proportionality, much more guidance is needed as to 
what the standard and its component parts mean.   
 
2. Threshold Procedural Protections 
 
In addition to clearly defined offenses, fairness and accuracy 
require the presence of procedural protections for the accused. The 
need for procedural rights is proportionally related to two things: (1) 
the seriousness of the charged offense and (2) the risk of false 
conviction.  
Above, I discussed the relationship between a defendant’s 
procedural rights and the gravity of the offense.187 The more serious 
the latter, the more potentially harsh the punishment, and therefore 
the more compelling the need for procedural rights that ensure the 
defendant has a full and fair chance to argue his or her case.  
As for the risks of inaccurate adjudication, four seem most 
serious in the context of campus adjudication of sexual assault: (1) 
OCR’s mandate that colleges must use the lowest standard of proof 
(preponderance of the evidence) in deciding these often complicated 
and confusing cases; (2) the lack of rules (on many campuses) 
surrounding notice, and ex ante access to the evidence, for the person 
charged; (3) the adjudication of such cases by untrained faculty, 
                                                                                                                                
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ education/he-said-it-was-consensual-she-was-
blacked-out-u-va-had-to-decide-was-it-assault/2016/07/14/4211a758-275c-11e6-ae4a-
3cdd5fe74204_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-main_uva-335pm%3Ahomepage%2 
Fstory (describing a case in which the core issue was whether or not (under the 
university’s standard) the victim was incapacitated by alcohol at the time of the 
sexual encounter; “To U-Va.,” wrote author Shapiro, “it was another drunken mess 
with no good answers.”).  
 186.  See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 
2014, 11:53 AM), 
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault 
(recounting the 2013 case of “John Doe” at Occidental College). 
 187.  See supra text accompanying note 154. 
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administrators, students, or Title IX administrators, who, in some 
cases, are charged with the investigation and adjudication of these 
cases despite the potential conflict of interest between their duty to 
be impartial in each case and their role as enforcer of OCR’s Title IX 
interpretations; and (4) the greatly constricted roles of 
representatives for the accused and complainant—for example 
barring them from questioning or cross-examining witnesses for the 
other side.  
It seems clear that the risk of false findings of liability is much 
greater in this context than it is even in civil court, where these 
procedural deficits do not exist in nearly the same degree. Feminist 
Judge and Law Professor Nancy Gertner has expressed the point 
well: 
 
What was troubling to me [about the new sexual misconduct 
procedures at Harvard] was not the [preponderance] 
standard in and of itself. It was that standard accompanied 
by considerably fewer protections. In civil court, civil rights 
cases and sexual harassment cases are all evaluated by a 
“fair preponderance” standard. But those proceedings take 
place after discovery—people have exchanged information; 
after lawyers; after hearings presided over by a judge. What 
was troubling at Harvard . . . was . . . a preponderance 
standard unaccompanied by any of those proceedings: no 
counselors for both sides, no hearing—no setting in which the 
accuser had to say what was going on and could be addressed 
by lawyers, even if not by the man accused.188 
 
The need for procedural protections in campus-based cases of 
sexual assault where the charged respondent faces the most serious 
possible institutional sanctions—expulsion and/or permanent 
notation of the offense and liability finding on his or her transcript—
is at its highest. At a minimum, such protections must include: 
 
• Complete, written notice of the charges against him or 
her, in advance of any investigation or adjudication.  
• Advance access to all the evidence obtained during the 
investigation. Only when an accused person has a full 
understanding of the charges and the evidence can he or she 
adequately prepare a defense. 
                                                                                                                                
 
 188.  The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, supra note 121.  
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• The right to a formal hearing, adjudicated by impartial 
and well-trained professionals, at which the respondent and 
complainant may be represented by attorneys or other 
professionally trained persons of his or her choice.189  
• Acknowledgement of the need for structural separation 
between investigators, adjudicators, and appellate authorities 
involved in these cases. Separation of roles and powers 
decreases the chance that bias and partiality will determine 
the outcome of a case. Thus, the many college misconduct 
codes which now allow investigators to recommend, or 
presumptively determine, liability are not valid.190 Nor are 
systems which house the investigative and adjudicative roles 
under the authority of the Title IX administrator. Structural 
separation allows for independent judgment, and 
independent judgment greatly assists accuracy, fairness, and 
the perception of fairness.  
• Permission for the parties to view the evidence well in 
advance, to ask questions, and to cross-examine witnesses at 
the required hearing.191 
• A full account, in writing, of the basis for the 
adjudicator’s decision as to liability. Such decision must 
                                                                                                                                
 
 189.  Many conduct codes specify, as does OCR’s April 2011 Dear Colleague 
letter, that adjudicators in these cases must be “trained.” See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER, supra note 8, at 8. What that means, however, is often unclear—especially 
since the standards almost always specify that representation by an attorney is not 
required. “All persons involved in implementing a recipient’s grievance procedures 
(e.g., Title IX coordinators, investigators, and adjudicators) must have training or 
experience in handling complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence, and in 
the recipient’s grievance procedures. The training also should include applicable 
confidentiality requirements. In sexual violence cases, the fact-finder and decision-
maker also should have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual violence.” 
Id. Schools should be transparent on the issue of how much training they offer to 
those who investigate cases and adjudicate the complicated procedural and 
evidentiary issues which are sometimes involved. 
 190.  See, e.g., Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard 
Community, supra note 162 (stating that the Title IX Office appoints investigator 
who in turn makes recommendation in final report). 
 191.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, 28 Harvard Law Professors Condemn Harvard’s 
New Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/15/28 (reprinting a 
letter by twenty-eight Harvard Law professors protesting the new sexual misconduct 
procedures at Harvard on the grounds that those procedures—which, among other 
changes, put the Title IX Coordinator in charge of the investigation and adjudication 
process—violate due process). 
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summarize the pertinent evidence, articulate the reasons for 
the decision, and locate those reasons within the school’s 
sexual misconduct policy and standard of liability. 
• The right to appeal the initial decision on any reasonable 
ground of evidentiary insufficiency, lack of impartiality, or 
failure to base the decision upon the policy or publicly 
available procedures.  
• Finally, the burden of proof should be raised to clear and 
convincing evidence, at least in cases where a finding of 
liability could result in the most serious punishment—
punishment that could permanently limit or destroy the 
respondent’s opportunity to complete their education. Such a 
move is permissible under U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
and seems indicated where serious harm to a defendant’s 
reputation or other important interests may result from a 
finding of liability.192 As the four cases discussed earlier in 
this Article illustrate, these threshold rights are not yet 
acknowledged requirements in college and university sexual 
misconduct codes. They must be, and soon. 
 
 3. Victims’ Rights 
 
People possess the right not to be sexually assaulted, and 
institutional authorities should protect and defend that right.193 On 
campus there are many ways of honoring these important rights, 
including aspirational policies that clearly define what respectful 
behavior toward others is and educate students about it—both in 
sexual contexts and otherwise.194 In adjudication that threatens 
punishment against a named offender, however, the criminal law 
model permits only those procedural victims’ rights which (1) aid the 
truth-finding function of the adjudication and (2) do not 
                                                                                                                                
 
 192.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (noting that the highest 
civil standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is available in cases “involving 
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant[, 
because t]he interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than 
mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the 
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof”). 
 193.  See supra Part III.C.  
 194.  Such education has become a major focus of campus student misconduct 
codes, and that is a positive step forward. See generally Silbaugh, supra note 52 
(making the case that this aspirational and pedagogical role of campus codes should 
be acknowledged and expanded).  
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substantially diminish the importance or the effectiveness of the 
procedural rights accorded to the person who faces punishment if 
found responsible.195 Victims do not have a “right” that the person 
they accuse be unjustly found liable or unfairly sanctioned. It serves 
no one’s interests, including the interests of victims, when cases 
against accused perpetrators are rushed to judgment or decided 
under vague, poorly defined standards or biased personnel, or when 
adjudicatory procedures are perceived by the community and/or 
general public to be biased and unfair. Only impartial and accuracy-
focused adjudications, featuring carefully defined offenses, strong 
procedural protections for the accused, and proportional sanctions, 
serve the legitimate interests of victims.  
 
4. Punishment that Fits the Offense 
 
Offenders who are legitimately found liable for sexual assault 
should be sanctioned. Few would argue that a student who 
perpetrates a violent sexual assault on another student or has sex 
with an unconscious student should not be expelled from the 
institution. Yet confusion reigns here, and those who frame and 
enforce campus sexual misconduct codes must clear it up.  
The confusion seems to have two sources. One is definitional, 
arising from sloppy analogizing to criminal law even from those who 
are otherwise skeptical of its ability to prosecute sexual misconduct 
cases. Demanding that colleges treat sexual assault as a “violent 
felony”196 is simply incoherent; colleges do not adjudicate or punish 
crimes. Similarly, speaking of a campus sexual assault as “rape”197 is 
a category error; rape is a crime and is adjudicated by criminal 
courts. If these statements simply urge that violent sexual assault be 
treated seriously and that when a person is found responsible for it 
by a legitimate adjudication process he or she should receive the 
most serious punishment that the university can impose, this could 
accord with the principles of the criminal law model, but only if the 
                                                                                                                                
 
 195.  Many of the rights now typically accorded to complainants in sexual 
misconduct cases would presumably be permitted under this standard, including, for 
example, complainants’ rights to equal representation at a hearing, equal access to 
the evidence uncovered by investigators, a full account of the decision in the case and 
its rationale, and to appeal an unfavorable decision. 
 196.  Hart, supra note 120 (“[T]he senator’s message was loud and clear: sexual 
assault is not okay and will not be tolerated. ‘We need to define this crime for the 
crime that it is,’ she said. ‘Rape is a felony. It is a violent felony.’”). 
 197.  See, e.g., Joe Drape & Marc Tracy, Protests Overshadow A Championship 
at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2016, at B10. 
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offenses in question are properly defined and the sanctions carefully 
gauged to fit the offense. On both of these fronts, many campus 
codes are heading in the wrong direction. 
Reformists argue that in the past, even when a respondent has 
been found guilty of sexual assault in a campus adjudication, 
colleges and universities have been reluctant to impose serious 
sanctions.198 In some cases, that is correct.199 But in the current, 
punitive environment, it has been claimed that expulsion should be 
the default sanction in all cases where a respondent is found to have 
committed sexual misconduct against another student.200  
That cannot be right. Both in the criminal system and in college 
codes, sexual misconduct typically covers a wide variety of behaviors 
ranging from “unwanted touching,” to “unwelcome sexual contact,” 
to forcible intercourse.201 For sentencing purposes, no criminal code 
treats a conviction for unwanted touching or unwelcome contact with 
the same severity as it treats rape.202 To do so would grossly violate 
                                                                                                                                
 
 198.  See, e.g. Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-allegations-against-fsu-jame 
is-winston.html. Bogdanich’s article raised questions about Florida State 
University’s failure to investigate sexual assault allegations against its star football 
player Jameis Winston until after football season ended: “The athletic department 
had known early on that Mr. Winston had been accused of a serious crime. . . . This 
knowledge should have set off an inquiry by the university.” Id. “According to federal 
rules, any athletic department official who learns of possible sexual misconduct is 
required to pass it on to school administrators.” Id. “‘Why did the school not even 
attempt to investigate the matter until after the football season?’ said John Clune, 
another lawyer for the accuser.” Id. Bogdanich’s article also quoted from an interview 
with former Florida prosecutor Adam Ruiz. Id. Discussing a sexual assault allegation 
at F.S.U. that he had prosecuted a decade before the Jameis Winston case, Mr. Ruiz 
told The New York Times: “I learned quickly what football meant in the South . . . . 
Clearly, it meant a lot. And with respect to this case I learned that keeping players 
on the field was a priority.” Id.  
 199.  See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual 
Assault Cases Result in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/29/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742.html 
(finding that fewer than one-third of cases in which respondents are found 
responsible for sexual misconduct result in expulsion). 
 200.  See, e.g., New, supra note 24. 
 201.  See, e.g., Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard 
Community, supra note 162. 
 202.  The Model Penal Code, for example, contains a number of sexual assault 
offenses graded by severity: rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual intercourse 
(by force or imposition), corruption of minors, sexual assault, and indecent exposure. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0–213.5 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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the proportionality principle. Unwanted touching and the like may 
properly be deemed offenses, but they are not as serious, and 
therefore should not be treated as harshly, as forced intercourse. The 
punishment for sexual misconduct and sexual assault on campus 
should closely track the criminal law model in this sense: while the 
sanctions available to college misconduct panels are different from 
those available to courts, the severity of punishment should follow a 
similarly proportional course. That is, nonconsensual intercourse 
should be punished most severely—expulsion and a permanent 
transcript notation seem quite fair in that context. Unwelcome 
sexual contact that does not involve intercourse should be punished 
less severely and so forth. Thus, colleges and universities must (1) 
carefully define each degree of offense and (2) carefully gauge the 
sanctions available to fit the gravity of the offense. The policies and 
procedures must give firm, clear guidance about the range of 
sanctions to adjudicators (and other personnel who, under current 
codes, may be involved in deciding responsibility and punishment or 
upholding them on appeal).  
 
 B. Answering the Three Questions 
 
This Article opened by posing three questions: (1) What harms 
may be prohibited by sexual misconduct codes? (2) What procedural 
rules and protections are required for adjudications under these 
codes? and (3) What sanctions are permissible when someone has 
been found responsible for violating the codes? Recognizing that 
some discretion must remain with adjudicators deciding individual 
cases, the criminal law model, when applied to the context of sexual 
assault on campus, suggests sound answers to all three questions. 
First, the question of prohibited harms. Student conduct codes must 
distinguish between those standards which are meant to be 
aspirational and to which students will be introduced by means of 
education, and those which articulate prohibitions that are 
punishable. Sexual misconduct codes—which contain the punishable 
prohibitions regarding sexual behavior—should carefully define 
offenses according to the rule that only harms which violate the 
rights of another person shall be the proper basis of a misconduct 
claim. Thus, the student who complains that he or she was 
manipulated into having sex with another student by the other’s 
                                                                                                                                
 
The Code’s general approach to the law of sexual assault has been widely criticized, 
but in this particular respect it reflects a general trend among post-1960s reformed 
rape statutes. Id.  
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threat to break off the relationship should not have a valid basis for 
bringing a charge under a properly constituted conduct code.  
The principle of personal freedom and autonomy in relationships 
also requires that such freedom and autonomy not be threatened or 
taken away except for good cause, proven under a rigorous standard 
by fair, professional, and impartial investigators and adjudicators. 
Many misconduct codes contain this language,203 but few articulate 
what terms like “well-trained,” “fair,” and “impartial” mean or how 
they ensure that those values are honored in the code. Colleges and 
universities must be more precise and more transparent about how 
they plan to achieve these important goals. 
Fair and accurate adjudication, in this context, requires the 
inclusion of procedural rights that are currently not honored by 
many institutions—for example, the right to advance notice of the 
charges, to full access to the evidence, to impartial and well-trained 
adjudicators, to a separation of powers between the functions of 
investigation, adjudication, appeal, and representation, and to a 
reasoned account of findings and justification of any sanction. 
Finally, proportional sanctioning means that the punishment 
must fit the offense: colleges and universities must adopt clear and 
defensible sanction regimes that prohibit them from either refusing 
to sanction a student who has been found responsible (because, for 
example, he is a star athlete at the school) or sanctioning a student 
too harshly. For example, violent sexual assault and sexual assault 
on someone who is unconscious merit serious punishments like 
expulsion; lesser forms of sexual contact, even if unwanted, do not. 
Colleges and universities must make clear to the public, and to the 
personnel who investigate and adjudicate the cases, exactly what 
constitutes an offense under the code and what range of sanctions 
the offense could trigger if the person charged is found liable. 
 
C. The DOE’s Proposal Would Restore Fundamental Fairness 
 
Under the standard developed here, the DOE’s proposed reforms 
would restore fairness to the process of adjudicating sexual assault 
on campus. In particular, the DOE’s proposed regulation would 
require school-recipients to offer advance written notice of the 
allegations and of the school’s procedures as well as possible 
sanctions and supportive measures,204 to give both parties equal 
                                                                                                                                
 
 203.  See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8. 
 204.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 48. 
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access to all relevant evidence obtained during the investigation,205 
to hold a live, formal hearing, staffed by impartial adjudicators,206 to 
permit cross-examination of witnesses, including the parties, at such 
hearing,207 to separate the Title IX coordinating function from the 
functions of investigating and adjudicating complaints,208 and to 
offer a written account of the basis for the final decision as to 
responsibility.209 The DOE’s proposal would also define “sexual 
harassment” in a way that clearly connects that offense to recipients’ 
duties under Title IX, authorizing complaints under the statute 
when “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex . . . is so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person 
equal access to the recipient’s [school’s] education program or 
activity.”210 Finally, although the proposed regulation would not 
mandate that schools apply the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in sexual harassment cases, it erases the prior requirement 
to use the preponderance standard, and restricts the use of 
preponderance to cases in which the school also uses that standard 
to adjudicate other types of misconduct potentially carrying the 
same conduct or involving the school’s employees, including 
faculty.211   
The proposed regulation is not perfect. Among the early concerns 
expressed by commentators, at least two merit further thought. 
First, the proposal restricts the availability of Title IX sexual 
harassment process to acts which occur “in an education program or 
activity of the recipient.”212 Some commentators have read this to 
mean that harassment which occurs off campus, for example at a 
fraternity party or other school-affiliated event, would not be 
actionable.213 The DOE should amend this provision to make clear 
that harassment at school-sponsored or affiliated events or sites, 
                                                                                                                                
 
 205.  Id. at 48. 
 206.  Id. at 41, 52.  
 207.  Id. at 52. 
 208.  Id. at 65. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 18. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  See, e.g., Marcotte, supra note 22 (Under the proposed rules, “a student 
who is raped by another student while off campus will have no recourse with the 
school.”); Rosenthal, supra note 22 (“The proposed regulations would also limit the 
scope of institutional responsibility to incidents that take place ‘within a recipient’s 
education program or activity,’ even if the accused is a student. This excludes many 
aspects of student life, including fraternities and off-campus residences.”).  
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even if those sites are technically off campus, could be the basis for 
valid complaints under Title IX.   
Second, the proposal allows (but does not require) school-
recipients to offer an appeal, and provides that “[i]f a recipient offers 
an appeal, it must allow both parties to appeal.”214 Some 
commentators worry that allowing complainants to appeal would 
subject respondents to the equivalent of double jeopardy, a risk that 
is prohibited in the criminal setting by the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution.215 While college and university misconduct panels are 
not explicitly governed by this constitutional ban, the theory 
developed here—that in the name of procedural fairness, schools 
should follow the core principles which have generated the rules of 
criminal punishment—suggests that respondents, at least, should be 
allowed to appeal. As for the double-jeopardy analogy, the proposed 
regulation states: “[A]lthough a complainant may appeal on the 
ground that the remedies are not designed to restore or preserve the 
complainant’s access to the recipient’s [school’s] education program 
or activity, a complainant is not entitled to a particular sanction 
against the respondent.”216 Thus far the DOE’s explanation of these 
provisions217 is not entirely satisfying. It is true, as the DOE 
suggests,218 that both complainants and respondents have important 
interests in fair and accurate adjudication of these cases. Of course 
the same is true in the criminal context—both complainant and 
defendant have important interests in the outcome. The rationale 
behind the rule against double jeopardy is not that complainants 
lack important interests, but that it is unfair to repeatedly put 
defendants through the stress of trial under threat of serious 
punishment. If double jeopardy did not exist, the state could simply 
appeal adverse verdicts until it got a conviction.   
The same fundamental rationale exists here: Respondents in a 
sexual harassment proceeding should not be subjected to retrial 
simply because a complainant does not like the recipient’s finding or 
the penalty. At the same time, unlike the criminal context, 
“remedies provided by the recipient to the complainant . . . to restore 
                                                                                                                                
 
 214.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 67. 
 215.  U.S. CONST., amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see, e.g., Susan Kruth, supra 
note 21 (“[T]he proposed regulations allow for complainants to appeal cases decided 
in favor of respondents, subjecting respondents to a situation akin to double 
jeopardy.”).  
 216.  DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 67. 
 217.  Id. at 67–69. 
 218.  Id. at 69. 
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or preserve access” to the school’s educational activities may include 
actions whose purpose is unrelated to punishing the respondent. If 
the regulation is interpreted to mean that complainants may not 
appeal for the purpose of changing a finding of non-liability or of 
increasing the respondent’s punishment but may appeal for other 
purposes (more directly related to the adequacy of remedies to 
restore complainant’s access to education), then it might satisfy 
concerns about “double jeopardy.” The DOE should (1) require 
school-recipients to grant the right of appeal in sex harassment 
cases and (2) further elucidate the grounds for such appeal by 
respondents and complainants. 
 
V. DOWNSIZING FAIR PROCESS 
 
The cases discussed in this Article could not happen at every 
American college or university today, but neither are they isolated 
examples. They are not exceptions to the trend; they exemplify it. 
Across the country, newly minted procedures for adjudicating sexual 
misconduct on campus now threaten accused persons with serious 
punishment under the lowest possible standard of proof, refuse to 
give accused respondents adequate notice of the charges against 
them, bar advocates for the parties from speaking during 
adjudicatory proceedings or testing the evidence of the opposing side 
by questioning witnesses, ignore clear conflicts of interest, and insist 
on a degree of secrecy which insulates campus process from salutary 
public scrutiny.  
Proponents of the new standards argue that because college 
conduct codes are not “law,” they need not be constrained by the 
standards which govern legal process.219 Obviously college codes are 
not “legal” in a formal sense (that is, they are not created or 
implemented by legislatures and courts).220 But the absence of 
                                                                                                                                
 
 219.  See, e.g., Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNOW YOUR IX, 
http://knowyourix.org/why-schools-handle-sexual-violence-reports (last visited Nov. 
19, 2018) (“Title IX doesn’t take sexual violence away from the criminal justice 
system; it just gives students additional rights because equality in education is so 
important.”). 
 220.  Legislatures and courts are increasingly becoming part of the discussion by, 
for example, defining key terms like what it means to “consent” to sex. See, e.g., CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 67386 (West 2018) (statute mandating that institutions of higher 
learning adopt affirmative consent rule when adjudicating cases of sexual assault); 
see also Campus Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/590/text (a proposed federal 
statute, sponsored primarily by Democrats, addressing the problem of sexual assault 
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formal legal status does not absolve colleges from their obligation to 
do justice for the parties whose fate they adjudicate. We do not 
concern ourselves with fair process only because statutes—or even 
constitutional doctrine—force us to do so. We concern ourselves with 
procedural fairness because it is a moral imperative when we 
consciously threaten someone with punishment. In the context of 
sexual misconduct, fairness means ensuring that victims’ claims of 
harm have a full chance to be heard, and that persons accused of 
inflicting such harm have a full opportunity to argue their 
innocence, and test the case of their accuser, before an impartial 
adjudicator. Harvard Law School Professor Janet Halley recently 
captured this intuition:  
Thing number one: We want to have workplaces and 
educational settings where sexual abuse is absent. . . . Thing 
number two: When we’re charging somebody with a violation 
of norms that are morally and legally important, we need to 
understand that we are bringing a major accusation against 
them, one that can destroy their career, their peace of mind, 
and their reputation. And three, we need to remember that 
the legitimacy of the sex-harassment system will be 
squandered if we don’t try to do both.221  
The duty to deliver accurate, fair, and impartial results is not 
exclusive to the law; it goes first to principles which justify and 
sustain the law. College adjudicators are not deciding “legal” cases 
per se, but in the campus setting, they are deciding whether or not to 
inflict punishment on the accused person before them. Where a 
finding of responsibility can visit serious punishment on an offender, 
colleges have a primary and indefeasible obligation to deliver justice.  
                                                                                                                                
 
on campus); Safe Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3403/text (a proposed federal 
statute, sponsored primarily by Republicans, addressing the same); Grace Erard, 
Virginia Legislature Passes Bills to Address Campus Sexual Assault, CAVALIER 
DAILY (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2015/03/virginia-
legislature-passes-bills-affecting-victim-autonomy (discussing Virginia’s statutory 
approach to campus sexual assault); Susan Svrluga, Do Students Get a Fair 
Hearing? An Effort to Change How Colleges Handle Sexual Assaults, WASH. POST 
(July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2015/07/29/do-students-get-a-fair-hearing-an-effort-to-change-how-colleges-
handle-sexual-assaults/ (discussing federal legislative efforts to address the 
problem). 
 221.  Dorment, supra note 76. 
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Proponents argue that because colleges are not empowered to 
inflict criminal-type punishments—namely, imprisonment—upon 
persons found responsible for sexual misconduct on campus, 
procedural safeguards are not as important in the campus setting as 
they are in the criminal one.222 But this argument misses the point. 
The question is not whether punishment in one sphere is identical to 
punishment in the other, but rather the degree to which sanctions 
available to adjudicators might seriously impact the person found 
“guilty” within the sphere in which those sanctions operate.  
The fact that colleges cannot deprive responsible parties of their 
liberty, as the criminal system often does, might justify some 
differences in adjudicatory process. The level of required procedural 
rights depends on the severity of the potential sanction. For 
example, if the most serious sanction available for committing 
sexual misconduct on campus were a $5.00 ticket, a low level of 
procedural protection for accused persons might be justified. But no 
one thinks that this is, or should be, the case. A person who commits 
a sexual assault should be severely punished, and the new sexual 
misconduct codes reflect that belief.223 But many colleges and 
universities, while lowering the procedural protections available to 
accused students, have simultaneously raised the level of 
punishment for persons found responsible for sexual misconduct.224 
This is what raises fairness concerns about the new misconduct 
codes.  
 “The idea that what we’re talking about here is just a civil 
sanction, the equivalent of money damages, is unreal to me,” says 
Professor Janet Halley.225 “When we expel or suspend a student and 
put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard for that person 
                                                                                                                                
 
 222.  See, e.g., Lombardi, supra note 132 (“Administrators stress that the college 
judicial system is, as IU’s Freeman, who heads the Office of Student Ethics, says, 
‘not the same thing as a court of law.’ Unlike criminal courts, which enforce rape 
statutes, college proceedings enforce ‘conduct codes’ that list prohibited acts like 
‘sexual assault’ or ‘sexual contact.’”). 
 223.  I should note, again, that this was not always the case. See, e.g., Dorment, 
supra note 76 (recalling that “Occidental, for its part, once assigned a book report to 
a student found responsible for sexual assault”); see also Bogdanich, supra note 26 
(raising questions about Florida State University’s handling of sexual assault 
allegation against star F.S.U. athlete Jameis Winston). 
 224.  See, e.g., Beth Howard, How Colleges Are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 28, 2015, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-battling-sexual-
violence (“A growing number of schools are also stiffening penalties for offenders. At 
Duke, for example, expulsion is now the favored sanction.”). 
 225.  Dorment, supra note 76. 
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to go to any other institution of higher education.”226 In the sphere of 
higher education, expulsion is the most severe punishment 
available. Where expulsion is a possible sanction, the cost of 
punishing an innocent respondent is at its highest and, therefore, 
procedural protections of the accused should be at their most 
rigorous.  
A third argument for dropping procedural protections in campus 
sexual assault cases points to the special evil of sexual assault, the 
harms it inflicts on victims, or both. The suggestion is that we must 
revamp the campus adjudication system in order to ensure that 
more perpetrators are reported and punished, even if fewer 
procedural protections raise the risk that innocent respondents will 
be found responsible and (unjustly) sanctioned. Here, discussion 
typically focuses on the clear and present danger posed by serial 
campus predators,227 the ubiquity of “rape culture” and its 
consequences,228 and the traumatic and enduring injury suffered by 
many victims of sexual assault.229  
It is of course no justification of unjust procedures to say that 
many (or even most) of the people charged under them are in fact 
guilty of the charge. That assertion may be true, but it is also beside 
the point. We do not accord rights to accused persons because we 
think they all are innocent of the crimes with they are charged. In 
law we accord such rights because we deem them necessary to a fair 
and accurate outcome. Even in cases where the prosecution’s 
evidence seems overwhelming, defendants deserve a fair chance to 
defend themselves and to test the evidence of their accusers.230  
                                                                                                                                
 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See, e.g., Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, What If Most Campus Rapes Aren’t 
Committed By Serial Rapists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 13, 2015), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-most-campus-rapes-arent-committed-by-
serial-rapists/. 
 228.  See, e.g., Tyler Bishop, The Laws Targeting Campus Rape Culture, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/ 
the-laws-targeting-campus-rape-culture/404824/. See generally College Rape Culture, 
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/topic/college-rape-culture (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2018) (a collection of articles discussing college rape culture). 
 229.  See, e.g., Sexual Assault on Campus, NAT’L INST. JUST., 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/campus/Pages/welcome.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (“Sexual assault can have devastating effects that can 
last a lifetime.”). 
 230.  See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–44 (1966); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent criminal 
defendant to an attorney is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial”). In order to 
introduce the confession of a suspect obtained during a police interrogation, the state 
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Again, everyone agrees that sexual assault should be punished. 
To the extent that colleges and universities are suppressing reports 
of sexual misconduct or letting perpetrators off lightly in order to 
further institutional interests such as maintaining a good reputation 
for campus safety, that behavior must be stopped.231 But punishing 
bad guys is not the only goal here. If it were, then colleges could 
accomplish that goal simply by finding all accused perpetrators 
responsible and expelling them. Why bother with investigating at 
all? And why allow any sanctions less serious than expulsion? If all 
reports were simply accepted as true and the accused respondents 
immediately expelled, then the guilty parties would be punished 
automatically. Such a system would also greatly increase the 
incentive to report, since complainants who did so would know from 
the start that their case is won. We avoid this approach for the 
simple reason that it would be unfair to strike the balance between 
the interests of reporting and responding parties so heavily in favor 
of the former. We seek a different balance, one which recognizes the 
interests of the accused in addition to that of the victim. The law, 
                                                                                                                                
 
must demonstrate that the suspect has been warned that he or she has the right to 
remain silent; that anything he or she does say may be used against her in court; and 
that he or she has the right to an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442–44. These 
“procedural safeguards” are necessary to “secure the [Fifth Amendment’s] privilege 
against self-incrimination,” Id. at 444, which “had its origin in a protest against the 
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which 
[have] long obtained in the continental system . . . . While the admissions or 
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked 
high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain 
his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the 
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press 
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a 
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in 
many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and 
Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for 
its total abolition.” Id. at 442–43.  
 231.  Whether accurate or not, the perception that colleges and universities act 
in this way is widespread. See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, An Unblinking Look at Sexual 
Assaults on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, at C1 (discussing the content of, and 
the reaction to, the film “The Hunting Ground”); Christina Cauterucci, “Don’t Accept 
Rape” Campaign Uses Acceptance Letters with a Dark Twist to Fight Campus Rape 
Culture, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/ 
2016/04/18/don_t_accept_rape_campaign_uses_dark_acceptance_letters_to_fight_ca
mpus.html; Tyler Kingkade, Two New Documentaries Will Highlight Student 
Activism Against Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/campus-rape-documentaries_n_65178 
40.html (discussing the films “The Hunting Ground” and “It Happened Here”). 
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especially criminal law, offers an inevitable frame of reference. 
Whether conducted on campus or in court, the integrity of an 
adjudication process requires that the system secure both parties’ 
procedural rights. This, according to many observers, is exactly what 
the new campus codes fail to do. Discussing Harvard’s revamped 
procedure for adjudicating sexual misconduct cases, Professor Halley 
told Esquire magazine:  
Every legal lever has been ticked in the direction of the 
accuser and against the [accused] . . . . I think it’s almost in 
bad faith to be arguing that we ‘need’ [the preponderance 
standard] because we have to get equality of the parties. It’s 
called going too far.232 
 
However flawed the above arguments are, they have thus far 
fueled the creation of university sexual misconduct procedures that 
raise the potential level of punishment for many campus sex offenses 
while simultaneously lowering the procedural standard for assessing 
responsibility. In place of a high standard of proof (for example, 
beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal setting and clear and 
convincing evidence on the civil side), colleges, following the 
guidance of OCR, are using the lowest possible standard, 
preponderance of the evidence. Instead of allowing lawyers to 
participate in a process governed by strict rules of evidence, colleges 
and universities assign college faculty and administrators, whose 
legal training is negligible at best, to assist both parties. Parties who 
do hire attorneys as advocates usually find—again, in accordance 
with strictures laid down by OCR—that the attorneys are not 
permitted to voice objections, question witnesses, or even to ask 
                                                                                                                                
 
 232.  Dorment, supra note 76. The fact that college misconduct proceedings are 
“civil” rather than “criminal” does not mandate the preponderance standard. In 
Addington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court noted that the highest civil 
standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is available in cases “involving 
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant[, 
because t]he interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than 
mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the 
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof.” 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). In its widely disseminated Dear Colleague 
letter of April 2011, OCR considered, and rejected, the clear and convincing evidence 
standard as applied to campus sexual misconduct proceedings under Title IX. See 
DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8 (“Grievance procedures that use this higher 
standard [of clear and convincing evidence] are inconsistent with the standard of 
proof established for violations of the civil rights laws, and are thus not equitable 
under Title IX.”). 
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questions during meetings with college investigators or adjudication 
proceedings.233 Instead of a full hearing run by impartial judges, 
many policies have transformed the adjudicatory process into a civil 
investigation that is supervised and controlled by a Title IX 
administrator whose mandate—to respond to the perceived crisis of 
sexual assault by taking a tougher stand toward accused 
perpetrators—presents an obvious conflict of interest that threatens 
the fairness and impartiality of these adjudications. It is no wonder 
that students found responsible under the new sexual misconduct 
procedures are suing, and often winning, in court.234 
 
 VI. CONCLUSION: INSPIRATION FROM CRIMINAL LAW 
 
In this Article, I have argued that the foundational principles 
that justify criminal punishment should form the basis for the 
adjudication and sanctioning of students in campus sexual 
misconduct proceedings. While the personnel, goals, and available 
sanctions are importantly different in the two settings of court and 
campus, the two systems of punishment share core values which 
should greatly inform the adjudication of sexual assault under 
college misconduct codes. 
No one suggests that college misconduct boards should employ 
the high standard of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—that applies 
in criminal cases, and few would insist on the level of procedural 
protection (e.g., the right to a publicly funded attorney for indigent 
                                                                                                                                
 
 233.  See, e.g., Sara Ganim & Nelli Black, An Imperfect Process: How Campuses 
Deal with Sexual Assault, CNN (Dec. 21, 2015, 4:38 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/us/campus-sexual-assault-tribunals/index.html 
(discussing procedures at University of California San Diego, where respondents are 
allowed to hire lawyers but their lawyers are not permitted to speak during the 
proceedings); Allie Grasgreen, Students Lawyer Up, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 26, 
2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/26/north-carolina-becomes-
first-state-guarantee-students-option-lawyer-disciplinary (noting that most 
universities do not allow lawyers to speak on their client’s behalf at disciplinary 
proceedings).  
 234.  See, e.g., Jake New, Court Wins for Accused, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Nov. 15, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punished-
over-sexual-assault-are-winning-lawsuits-against-colleges (“Students suspended or 
expelled over allegations of sexual assault rarely succeed in lawsuits against the 
institutions that punished them. That’s starting to change.”); Jake New, Out of 
Balance, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2016/04/14/several-students-win-recent-lawsuits-against-colleges-punished-the 
m-sexual-assault (“Colleges lose series of rulings in suits brought by male students 
accused of sex assault. In stinging decisions, judges fault lack of due process.”). 
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defendants) that criminal defendants receive. But it is too easy to 
understate the degree to which a finding of responsibility for sexual 
assault can affect the life of a party who is found to be responsible. 
As colleges and universities increase the possible sanctions for 
sexual misconduct, including expulsion and permanent notations on 
the educational records of student violators, we should acknowledge 
that harsher penalties place a proportionately heavier burden on 
college policymakers to get it right.  
It is crucial that colleges treat reports of sexual assault seriously, 
that they punish such assaults appropriately, and that they try to 
help survivors deal with the emotional trauma of assault, both 
during and after the adjudication process. But it is just as important 
to assure the accused person of a fair and impartial adjudicatory 
proceeding in which he or she has adequate opportunity to 
understand the process, absorb and respond to the complainant’s 
evidence, and present his or her case to those who will decide 
whether or not a code violation took place. A process that is not fair, 
or is not perceived to be fair, to both parties cannot serve the 
interests of anyone, including the victims of sexual assault. In 
deciding their response to the new regulation proposed by the DOE, 
colleges and universities should not reflexively defend misconduct 
codes that were themselves too hastily assembled in response to 
controversial mandates from the government. This time, instead, 
they should think more carefully about what fairness means in the 
context of adjudicating sexual misconduct charges on campus. The 
principles which ground the criminal process are the best place to 
start. 
 
 
